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INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION AND THE CLEAN
WATER ACT: OKLAHOMA v. EPA CREATES THE
PREVENTATIVE REMEDY
INTRODUCTION
When Congress amended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act in 1972,'
it began a series of events which created uncertainty in the rights and reme-
dies available to states in interstate water pollution cases. In 1981, the United
States Supreme Court held that the 1972 amendment preempted federal com-
mon law Then, in 1987, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, now known as the Clean Water Acts ("CWA"), pre-
empted a state's own common law remedies to the extent that it sought to
impose liability on a discharger located in another state.' As a result of these
two decisions, referred to as the "preemption cases," states affected by water
pollutant discharges in another state ("affected states") appeared to have little
control over pollution crossing into their borders from out-of-state sources
("source states").5
. Recently, in a case of first impression, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit empowered affected states with the ability to control
interstate water pollution. In Oklahoma v. EPA,' the court held that no dis-
charge permit shall issue to a discharger unless the discharger complies with
all applicable water quality standards ("WQSs"), 7 including the federally ap-
proved standards of affected downstream states.8
The propriety of the court's interpretation of the CWA becomes apparent
after examining the CWA as a whole and the preemption cases9 leading up to
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1175 (1970), amended by 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. II 1972).
2. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois ("Milwaukee ii"), 451 U.S. 304 (1981). For a full discus-
sion of the Court's rationale, and criticisms of the City of Milwaukee decision, see Note, Preemp-
tion of Federal Common Law-City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 31 DEPAUL L. REV. 201 (1981).
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
4. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987). In Ouellette, the Court held that
the common law of the state in which the polluter is located is the applicable law. Id. at 500.
5. See Note, State Common Law Actions and Federal Pollution Control Statutes: Can They
Work Together?, 1986 U. ILL L. REV. 609, 623 (discussing possible remedies available to affected
states); Riley, The Balkanization of Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J.. June 18, 1984, at 1, 30.
6. 908 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1990).
7. A water quality standard ("WQS") consists of a use designation for the water and the crite-
ria necessary to meet that use. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2) (1988). For example, a WQS might re-
quire a particular section of a river to be of fishable-swimmable use and require the phosphorous
concentration of that water to be no more than 25 milligrams per liter. See Mississippi Comm'n
on Natural Resources v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269, 1272 (5th Cir. 1980) (defining a WQS).
8. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 615.
9. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (holding that the CWA preempts
federal and state common law to the extent that it is applied to an out-of-state source); (Milwau-
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Oklahoma.1" The court's decision is further supported when one considers the
fact that pollution does not recognize state boundaries. The court correctly
determined that the mandate of the CWA would become illusory if upstream
sources were free to ignore downstream states' WQSs. 1" The court's decision
also discourages congressionally condemned "pollution shopping" by industry
seeking states with less stringent WQSs.12
The decision creates a preventative remedy for states, empowering them to
control the amount of pollution entering their waters from out-of-state sources
before a discharge actually occurs. A state can now set its WQSs as strin-
gently as it desires, and after approval by the EPA, it can require dischargers
to comply with the WQSs before a permit is issued and any discharge takes
place.
Prior to Oklahoma, the preemption cases appeared to leave an affected state
with little ability to protect its waters from out-of-state dischargers." Out-of-
state dischargers, like the pollution they discharged, could ignore state bound-
ary lines. The following hypothetical demonstrates the typical situation. As-
sume one state has a state scenic river park extending along the river for some
distance into the state. In order to protect the scenic beauty and wildlife in
this park, this affected state imposes stringent WQSs on this section of the
river. Forty miles upstream from the border of this state, the neighboring state
builds a wastewater treatment plant which discharges directly into this river.
This source state's WQSs are substantially less stringent than the affected
state's. The source state then obtains a permit from the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency ("EPA") based only on the restriction that the treatment plant
may not violate the source state's liberal WQSs. However, computer projec-
tions show that the expected discharge will violate the affected state's WQSs
and seriously degrade the water quality in that state's portion of the river.
Nonetheless, because the treatment plant is restricted only by the source
state's WQSs, it begins to discharge into the river. Thus, the affected state's
attempts to preserve this river are undermined.1 4
As a result of Oklahoma, source states are required to respect and comply
with affected states' WQSs. The decision recognizes that the transitory nature
of water pollution makes it a national problem which cannot be solved by iso-
lated, state-by-state regulation. The Tenth Circuit realized that Oklahoma's
kee I1), 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (same); see infra notes 203-20 and accompanying text (discussing
these two cases).
10. See infra notes 306-54 and accompanying text (analyzing the Oklahoma court's discussion
of the CWA and the preemption cases).
11. See infra notes 316-17 and accompanying text (discussing the court's interpretation of the
CWA's general regulatory framework).
12. See infra note 320 and accompanying text (discussing the "pollution shopping" that would
occur absent the Oklahoma decision).
13. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the preemption cases on
the scope of remedies available to affected states); infra notes 203-20 and accompanying text
(discussing the preemption cases).
14. This was essentially the situation involved in Oklahoma.
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attempts to preserve its water quality by setting stringent WQSs is merely
aspirational if their WQSs are violated by an Arkansas discharger.1
Section I of this Note reviews the CWA. In Section I, relevant provisions of
the CWA are examined along with the corresponding legislative history. The
preemption cases are also discussed in Section I. Section II details the factual
background, procedure, and the Tenth Circuit's analysis in Oklahoma. Section
III analyzes the implications of the court's holding, argues that one state can-
not use economic arguments to have the EPA declare another state's WQSs
inconsistent with the CWA, and examines the enforcement remedies available
to states under the CWA. Finally, the last section of this Note discusses how
Oklahoma necessarily expands the EPA's role in overseeing water quality reg-
ulation under the CWA. Furthermore, environmentally conscious states will be
encouraged to revise existing WQSs, and actively enforce their WQSs against
neighboring states. The section concludes with a discussion of the possible en-
forcement remedies available to affected states and the steps a state must take
to ensure other states comply with its WQSs.
I. BACKGROUND
When the Supreme Court first defined a federal common law remedy for
interstate pollution cases in 1972, Justice Douglas pointed out that "new fed-
eral laws and new federal regulations may in time preempt the field of federal
common law."' 6 Even though the federal courts, unlike state courts, generally
do not have the power to develop and apply their own laws, 7 the Court con-
cluded that federal courts often fashion common law "where there is an over-
riding federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of decision."1 8 Therefore,
given a strong federal interest in the purity of interstate waters, the Court
found it necessary to create federal common law.19
Shortly after that decision, in 1972, Congress amended the then existing
Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("FWPCA"). 20 The preemption line of
cases held that the CWA preempted the federal common law of nuisance and
state common law remedies to the extent that only the law of the discharger's
15. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 606 (10th Cir. 1990).
16. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee ("Milwaukee 1"), 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972). This was the first
in a series of three disputes between Illinois and the City of Milwaukee. This first case recognized
that a federal common law action existed in interstate water disputes. Id. at 107 & n.9. The
second case held that the CWA preempted any federal common law actions. Milwaukee II, 451
U.S. 304 (1981). Finally, Illinois unsuccessfully sought relief against Milwaukee under Illinois
state nuisance law. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee ("Milwaukee I1"), 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985).
17. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
18. Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. at 105 & n.6. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1151-1175 (1970), was in place at the time of the litigation, but the Court found that the Act
did not adequately address the problem Illinois faced. Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. at 103.
19. Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. at 102-06.
20. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1175 (1970), amended by 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. II 1972).
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state could be used against that discharger.21 The 1972 FWPCA amendments,
therefore, left unclear what remedies were available to affected states in inter-
state water pollution cases. Delineating an answer begins with an understand-
ing of the CWA.
A. Definitions
The CWA defines several terms which are critical to understanding the
CWA's provisions. The CWA regulates the discharge of pollutants into navi-
gable waters by point source dischargers. The "discharge" of a pollutant is
defined broadly as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from
any point source."'2 2 The "pollutants" which the CWA regulates include the
residual materials from industrial processes and municipal waste treatment fa-
cilities.23 "Navigable waters" include any "waters of the United States. 21 4
This is a very broad definition encompassing virtually all bodies of water.2 5 A
"point source" is "any discernible, confined and discrete" conduit. 26 A point
source would include, for example, a pipe, trench, ditch, tunnel, or well. 27 The
EPA is the federal administrative agency responsible for the protection of the
Nation's environment, and more specifically, authorized by Congress to exe-
cute the provisions of the CWA.28
21. See infra notes 203-20 and accompanying text (discussing the preemption cases).
22. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1988).
23. Id. § 1362(6). Section 1362(6) defines "pollutant" as:
dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, muni-
tions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or
discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricul-
tural waste discharged into water. This term does not mean (A) "sewage from ves-
sels" within the meaning of section 1322 of this title; or (B) water, gas, or other
material which is injected into a well to facilitate production of oil or gas, or water
derived in association with oil or gas production and disposed of in a well, if the well
used either to facilitate production or for disposal purposes is approved by authority
of the State in which the well is located, and if such State determines that such
injection or disposal will not result in the degradation of ground or surface water
resources.
Id.
24. Id. § 1362(7) (defining navigable waters as "the waters of the United States, including the
territorial seas").
25. 2 ENVTL. LAW INST., LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 12.05[l][a] (S. Novick ed.
1990). One type of water that is not "navigable water" is underground water. Id.
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1988). Section 1362(14) provides in full:
The term "point source" means any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,
including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete
fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or
other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does
not include return flows from irrigated agriculture.
Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. § 1251(d). The EPA's authority to execute the CWA is limited only where "otherwise
expressly provided in [the CWA]." Id.
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The CWA has two mechanisms to regulate the discharge of pollutants from
point source dischargers: WQSs and effluent limitations.2" Initially under the
CWA, the federally designated effluent limitations, which were based on the
technological and economic ability of a source to control its discharge, were an
important weapon in regulating water pollution."0 However, as point sources
achieve compliance with federal effluent limitations, the role of WQSs has be-
come increasinglymore important. As a result, states are turning to WQSs to
establish more stringent limitations on the discharge of pollutants into their
waters.3"
Effluent limitations and WQSs are distinct concepts but combine to form an
important regulatory framework under the CWA. WQSs are numerical or
narrative limits established for both individual pollutants, such as phosphorous
and lead, and for general parameters, such as pH (acidity) or water clarity.32
WQSs reflect the amount of water quality degradation, resulting from pollu-
tants, considered by the state agency to be consistent with that water's desig-
nated use.33 Thus, a WQS consists of two parameters: a use designation, and
the water quality criteria necessary to meet that use. 4 A use designation rep-
resents the level of water quality that the state desires for a particular body of
water based on the general purpose of that water.3 5 Water quality criteria are
29. ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 25, § 12.0513] [c] [i]; see United States Steel Corp. v. Train,
556 F.2d 822, 830 (7th Cir. 1977); Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279, 1281
(D.S.D. 1979); infra notes 82-127 and accompanying text (discussing the establishment of WQSs
under § 303 of the CWA). The CWA also provides for the establishment of other water quality
based limitations. ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 25, § 12.05[3] [c]. These include federally estab-
lished water quality based effluent limitations under § 302, toxic effluent standards under
§ 307(a)(2), and restrictions on marine water discharges under § 403. Id.
30. Gaba, Federal Supervision of State Water Quality Standards Under the Clean Water Act,
36 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1169 (1983). WQSs were abandoned as a primary mechanism of water
pollution control because scientific and administrative difficulties arose in implementing them. Id.;
see F. SKILLERN. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK § 4.05 (1981) (discuss-
ing the role of effluent limitations under the CWA); infra notes 54-71 and accompanying text
(discussing the setting of effluent limitations under § 301 of the CWA).
31. See Gaba, supra note 30, at 1170.
32. See ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 25, §§ 12.0113][b]-[c], 12.0513][c][i][A] (discussing
WQSs under the CWA).
33. Id. A WQS is defined by the federal regulations as:
provisions of State or Federal law which consist of a designated use or uses for the
waters of the United States and water quality criteria for such waters based upon
such uses. Water quality standards are to protect the public health or welfare, en-
hance the quality of water and serve the purposes of the Act.
40 C.F.R. § 131.3 (1990).
34. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2) (1988). The WQSs involved in Oklahoma were narrative. For ex-
ample, the criteria for Oklahoma's nutrients WQS required that "[t]he total phosphorous concen-
tration and the nitrogen/phosphorous concentration ratio shall not be increased to levels which
result in man-induced eutrophication problems." Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 617 (10th Cir.
1990).
35. 40 C.F.R. § 131.2 (1990). With regard to use designations, § 131.10 provides:
The classification of the waters of the State must take into consideration the use and
value of water for public water supplies, protection and propagation of fish, shellfish
1991] 1111
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defined as elements of WQSs "expressed as constituent levels, or narrative
statements, representing a quality of water that supports a particular use."36
For example, a WQS might designate a certain river to be used as fishable
and swimmable water (use designation), and require a water quality criteria of
no more than twenty-five milligrams of chloride per liter of water (water qual-
ity criterion). Federal regulations require the criteria used by the state must
be based on "sound scientific rationale and must contain sufficient parameters
or constituents to protect the designated use."37
"Effluent limitations" are defined under the CWA as "any restriction estab-
lished by a State or the [EPA] on quantities, rates, and concentrations of
chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents which are discharged
from point sources into navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous zone, or
the ocean."3 8 Thus, an effluent limitation may, for example, restrict a point
source from discharging effluent with a concentration of more than thirty mil-
ligrams of suspended solids (sewage particles in water) per liter of discharge. 9
WQSs are considered to supplement effluent limitations in that they can be
used to further regulate a point source's discharge.4 0 Effluent limitations can
be considered the means of preventing and restricting discharges at their
source, whereas WQSs are a measure of effectiveness. 4' That is, a state or the
EPA places effluent limitations on the discharger in order to meet the applica-
ble WQSs of the body of water in which the pollution is being discharged.4 2
and wildlife, recreation in and on the water, agricultural, industrial, and other pur-
poses including navigation.
Id. § 131.10 (1990).
36. Id. § 131.3(b).
37. 40 C.F.R. § 131.11(a) (1990).
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (1988); see infra notes 54-71 and accompanying text (discussing
effluent limitations under § 301 of the CWA). States are required to "identify those waters within
its boundaries for which the effluent limitations required by [the Act] are not stringent enough to
implement any [WQS] applicable to such waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(l)(A) (1988); see F.
SKILLERN, supra note 30, § 4.09. However, there are other means available to treat pollutants
other than discharging them into navigable waters. Alternate treatment strategies such as land
disposal, shipment to other waters, and in-plant processes can be used as a means of reducing the
amount of waste discharged into navigable waters, thereby making it easier to meet the required
WQSs. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 46-47 (1971), reprinted in 2 SENATE COMMITTEE ON
PUBLIC WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMEND-
MENTS OF 1972, at 1419, 1464-65 (1973) [hereinafter 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
39. Note, supra note 2, at 215 n.79. The effluent concentration is measured at the point of
discharge, referred to as "at the pipe."
40. EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 n.12
(1976); see ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 25, § 12.05[3][c][i] (stating that point sources must
meet technology based limitations as well as additional restrictions if necessary to comply with
applicable WQSs); Gaba, supra note 30, at 1169-70 (stating that WQSs supplement effluent
limitations).
41. See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY.
supra note 38, at 1426.
42. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (1988); see also EPA v. California ex rel. State. Water
Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 205 n.12 (explaining that WQSs supplement effluent limita-
tions so that "numerous point sources, despite individual compliance with effluent limitations, may
1112
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In sum, the CWA requires any point source discharging pollutants into nav-
igable waters to meet federally established, technology-based effluent limita-
tions, as well as any other effluent limitations necessary to insure compliance
with any applicable WQSs. WQSs can be considered the desired ends which
must be attained by the means of effluent limitations. A more in-depth exami-
nation of specific provisions of the CWA reveals how these two mechanisms
are implemented to protect the nation's waters.
B. The Clean Water Act
The CWA is regarded as a "comprehensive" and "all-encompassing" ap-
proach to water pollution regulation."3 The objective of the CWA is "to re-
store and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Na-
tion's waters.""' To accomplish this objective, the CWA's mandate is to
eliminate discharges of pollutants into navigable waters.' The CWA makes
the discharge of any pollutant unlawful, except as allowed under specific sec-
tions of the CWA."I Section 402 of the CWA creates the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES"). 47 Under the NPDES, a point
source must obtain a permit to discharge pollutants into navigable waters.48
Through the NPDES, WQSs and effluent limitations become individual point
source obligations.'" That is, the WQSs become the ends that must be
achieved by the means of effluent limitations which must be followed by a
be further regulated to prevent water quality from falling below acceptable levels"); 33 U.S.C. §
1312(a) (1988) (requiring the EPA to set effluent limitations "which can reasonably be expected
to contribute to the attainment [of the necessary] water quality"); ENVTL. LAW INST.. supra note
25, § 12.05[3][c][i] (stating that specific effluent limitations must be set to insure that the WQSs
are not violated).
43. Milwaukee 11, 451 U.S. 304, 318 (1981).
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).
45. Id. § 1251(a)(1).
46. Section 301 of the CWA provides: "Except as in compliance with this section and sections
[1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title], the discharge of any pollutant by any
person shall be unlawful." Id. § 1311(a). Sections 1328, 1342, and 1344 establish permit proce-
dures that allow a permit holder to discharge pollutants into navigable waters. Id. §§ 1328, 1342,
1344. Section 1312(a) allows the EPA to set water quality related effluent limitations, but a point
source will not have to comply with such a limitation if it can show that there is "no reasonable
relationship between the economic and social costs and the benefits to be obtained." Id. § 1312(a),
(b)(2). Section 1316 allows newly constructed point sources that meet currently applicable federal
standards of performance to be free from "any more stringent standard of performance for a ten-
year period beginning on the date of completion [of the point source]." Id. § 1316(d); see ENVTL.
LAW INST., supra note 25, § 12.05[3][a][iv][C]. Section 1317 establishes special procedures gov-
erning the discharge of toxic pollutants. 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1988).
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1988).
48. Id. § 1342(a)(1). Section 1342(a)(1) provides, in part: "Except as provided in sections
[1328 and 1344 of this title], the [EPA] may, after opportunity for public hearing, issue a permit
for the discharge of any pollutant, . . . notwithstanding [section 131 l(a) of this title] . I..." d
49. Id. §§ 1311-1345; see also EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd.,
426 U.S. 200, 205 (1976) (discussing the NPDES system).
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discharger.50 The CWA sets minimum requirements for water pollution con-
trol. 51 However, a state is free to set more stringent measures. 2 State WQSs
are approved by the EPA and become the WQSs for the applicable waters of
the State.5 At issue in Oklahoma was whether an out-of-state discharger
must comply with a neighboring state's WQSs.
The CWA can be better understood by examining relevant provisions of the
CWA along with appropriate legislative history. The discussion first examines
the prohibition of pollutant discharges without a permit. Next, the EPA's au-
thority to set stricter effluent limitations than those set by the state is ex-
amined. The sections governing the state's review and subsequent federal ap-
proval of a state's WQSs are examined next. Finally, sections regulating the
rights of the states to set WQSs and effluent limitations, and to administer
discharge permits, are examined, as well as the enforcement procedures avail-
able under the CWA.
1. Section 301: Requiring Permits and Setting Effluent Limitations
Section 301 has been referred to as "the cornerstone of the [CWA]. '5 4 This
section prohibits the discharge of any pollutant into navigable waters by any
person without a permit issued under the CWA. 55 Section 301 contains two
kinds of restrictions on the discharge of pollutants. First, the EPA must estab-
lish federal technology-based effluent limitations. 6 The goal of these limita-
tions is to use technology that will eventually eliminate pollutant discharges
into navigable waters. 7 In this regard, Congress intended the CWA to be
"technology forcing," pressing technology and economics to achieve increas-
ingly tougher goals on industry.58 Second, section 301 requires either the state
50. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between effluent
limitations and WQSs).
51. See ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 25, § 12.02; see also United States Steel Corp. v. Train,
556 F.2d 822, 837-38 (7th Cir. 1977) (discussing the roles of the states and the federal govern-
ment under the CWA).
52. See 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1988) ("Except as expressly provided in this Act, nothing in this
Act shall (I) preclude or deny the right of any State . . .to adopt or enforce (A) any standard or
limitation respecting discharges of pollutants. ... ); see also United States Steel Corp,, 556
F.2d at 835 (discussing the powers of a state under the CWA); Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA,
477 F. Supp. 1279, 1284 (D.S.D. 1979) (stating that the EPA cannot disapprove a state's WQSs
set pursuant to § 1370); ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 25, § 12.02 (discussing the federalism
issue under the CWA).
53. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3) (1988) ("if the [EPA] ...determines that such standard meets
the requirements of this chapter, such standard shall thereafter be the [WQSs] for the applicable
waters of that State.").
54. Hornestake Mining Co., 477 F. Supp. at 1281.
55. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1988); see also ENVTL. LAW INST.. supra note 25, § 12.05[3][a]
(discussing § 301).
56. 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(l)(A)-(B), (2)(A)-(F) (1988); F. SKILLERN, supra note 30, § 4.05
(1981).
57. F. SKILLERN. supra note 30, § 4.05.
58. See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 46 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
1114 [Vol. 40:1107
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or the EPA to achieve the effluent limitations necessary to meet state WQSs
or other requirements of state or federal law. 9
The CWA initially required the EPA to establish effluent limitations for
industrial dischargers based on the "best practicable control technology."60
This technology required the elimination of only those discharges where "the
costs imposed on the industry [were] worth the benefits in pollution reduc-
tion."61 Congress then amended the CWA, requiring the technological stan-
dard applied to the point source to be dependent on the type of the dis-
charge." Accordingly, for discharges of conventional pollutants, the EPA sets
supra note 38, at 1464. The report also states, "Pollution continues because of technological lim-
its, not because of any inherent right to use the nation's waterways for the purpose of disposing of
wastes." Id. at 42, 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1460.
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(1)(C) (1988). This section states:
In order to carry out the objective of this Act there shall be achieved . . . not later
than July 1, 1977, any more stringent limitation, including those necessary to meet
water quality standards, treatment standards, or schedules of compliance, established
pursuant to any State law or regulations (under authority preserved by [section
1370]) or any other Federal law or regulation, or required to implement any applica-
ble water quality standard established pursuant to this Act.
Id.; see also United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 830 (7th Cir. 1977) (discussing
how the CWA provides for federal effluent limitations and for states to set more stringent limita-
tions, including WQSs); V. YANNACONE. B. COHEN & S. DAVISON, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES § 5:11 (Supp. 1988) (discussing § 131 I's regulatory framework).
The Oklahoma court noted that § 301 was interpreted by the Chief Judicial Officer and Ad-
ministrative Law Judge as requiring out-of-state sources to meet WQSs of another state.
Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 608 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting Order on Petitions for Review);
see also S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 44 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY.
supra note 38, at 1462 ("Section 301(b)(l)(C) provides adequate authority to apply new informa-
tion to existing water quality requirements and upgrade effluent limits accordingly." (emphasis
added)); H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d sess. 100 (1972) reprinted in SENATE COMMITTEE ON
PUBLIC WORKS. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMEND-
MENTS OF 1972, at 787 (1973) [hereinafter I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. The House report states:
"Subsection (b) of section 301 establishes a technological basis for the determination of effluent
limitations for any discharge of pollutants provided that such limitations, at a minimum, are,
when applied to all point sources, adequate to meet existing or new water quality standards as
provided under section 303." Id. (emphasis added). The report continues:
[T]he Committee intends that if the sum of the discharges from point sources meeting
such effluent limitations would preclude the meeting of water quality standards in
existence on the date of enactment of the 1972 Amendments, or those promulgated
pursuant to section 303, new and more stringent effluent limitations would have to be
established consistent with such water quality standards.
Id. at 101-02, I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 59, at 788-89 (emphasis added).
60. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(l)(A) (1988); see United States Steel Corp., 556 F.2d at 830 (dis-
cussing how the CWA restricts the discharge of pollutants). Best practicable control technology is
referred to as "BPT." ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 25, § 12.05[3][a][ii][A]. The CWA treats
publicly owned treatment works ("POTW") differently than industrial dischargers. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311 (b)(l)(B) (1988) (excepting POTWs from BPT and creating a separate category of effluent
limitations based on secondary treatment technology).
61. National Ass'n of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624, 662 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing EPA v.
National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 76 (1980)).
62. See 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b) (1988); ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 25, § 12.05[3][a][ii][A];
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effluent limitations that comply with the best conventional pollutant control
technology ("BCT").63 For discharges of toxic and non-conventional pollu-
tants, the EPA applies the best available control technology ("BAT"). 4
In setting effluent limitations that comply with the BCT, the EPA must
perform a cost/benefit analysis. 6 This cost-effectiveness test compares the
costs and benefits of the effluent reduction technology.66 The analysis takes
into account "the age of equipment and facilities involved, the process em-
ployed, the engineering aspects of the application of various types of control
techniques, process changes, non-water quality environmental impact (includ-
ing energy requirements), and such other factors as the [EPA] deems
appropriate. '6 7
In contrast, a cost/benefit analysis is not required for BAT, although the
same factors are considered and cost is weighed in considering whether the
technology is achievable.68 However, because the CWA demands the eventual
elimination of pollutant discharges, the benefits in pollution reduction achieved
under BAT need not be greater than the costs to the industry. 9 Thus, even
technology that involves costs that outweigh the benefits of the resulting pollu-
tion reduction must be utilized.7 0 The industrial discharger must commit the
"maximum resources economically possible," incorporating all available tech-
nology which is economically achievable.7  Therefore, the EPA's authority to
F. SKILLERN, supra note 30, § 4.05. There are four classes of pollutant discharges under the
CWA: conventional, toxic, unconventional, and heat. ENVTL. LAW INST,, supra note 25, §
12.05 31[a] [ii] [A].
63. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(I)(A)-(2)(F) (1988); see also F. SKILLERN, supra note 30, § 4.05
(discussing how effluent limitations are set under § 1311). Conventional pollutants include sus-
pended solids, fecal coliform, pH, oil, and grease. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(4) (1988); ENVTL.
LAW INST., supra note 25, § 12.05[3][a][iii][B]. Conventional pollutants are those typically dis-
charged by POTW. Id. POTWs are required to achieve secondary treatment standards as defined
by the EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(I)(B) (1988).
64. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(2)(A)-(F) (1988). This would include pollutants such as ammonia,
chlorides, nitrates, and iron. ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 25, § 12.05[3][a][iii][C].
65. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B) (1988); see also ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 25,
§ 12.05[3][a][iii][B] (discussing the setting of BCT for conventional pollutants).
66. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B) (1988); ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 25,
§ 12.05[3][a][iiil[B].
67. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B) (1988); ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 25,
§ 12.05[31[a][iii][B].
The EPA must also perform another cost test, which was intended to equate BCT with the
technology applied to POTW. Id. This test requires the EPA to compare the cost of reduction of
conventional pollutants from POTW with the same cost from a category of industrial sources. Id.
68. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B) (1988); ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 25, §
12.05[3][a][iii][E]; see American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1058 (3d Cir. 1975).
69. National Ass'n of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624, 662-63 (3d Cir. 1983); see also
Reynolds Metals Co. v. EPA, 760 F.2d 549, 565 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that no cost/benefit
balancing is required for BAT).
70. National Ass'n of Metal Finishers, 719 F.2d at 662.
71. Id. at 662-63 (citing EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 74 (1980)); see
also ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 25, § 12.05[3][a][iii][E] (discussing the determination of
what is economically achievable to an industry).
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set effluent limitations is limited by the costs of the technology.
Section 301 is violated, therefore, when a discharger does not obtain a per-
mit according to the terms of the CWA. Section 301 requires the EPA to set
effluent limitations based on the current technological ability to achieve those
limitations. The EPA's technological dictates apply differently depending on
the type of the discharge. Nevertheless, section 301 requires either a state or
the EPA to establish the effluent limitations necessary to meet state WQSs.
2. Section 302: Water-Quality Related Effluent Limitations
Section 302 of the CWA authorizes the EPA to supplement effluent limita-
tions set pursuant to section 301.72 The EPA has the authority to establish
effluent limitations for the point source necessary to maintain the water qual-
ity of the affected water whenever a discharge from a point source would in-
terfere with the attainment or maintenance of the water quality of a navigable
water.7 Section 302 also requires a cost/benefit hearing before the EPA es-
tablishes the effluent limitations.7 4
Section 302, like section 301, may also provide an out-of-state point source,
and its state, with the ability to limit the EPA's authority in setting more
stringent effluent limitations by allowing economic and social factors relevant
to the state's economic well-being to be recognized by the EPA.5 However,
this section guarantees a hearing only if the more stringent effluent limitations
are adopted under EPA authority, not state authority.76
The legislative history of section 302 indicates that this provision is to be
used by the EPA only under extraordinary circumstances, such as when limi-
72. H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 104 (1972), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 59, at 791.
73. 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (1988).
74. Id. § 1312(b); see also Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279, 1285 (D.S.D.
1979) (section 302 only requires a hearing when water quality goals are not being attained).
However, a Senate report on this section noted:
The [effluent] limitations necessary to achieve a given level of water quality . . .
may require more control . . . than that attainable through the application of [BAT].
• . . [Flurther reduction of the level of effluent entering the affected waters may
not be possible through control technology, yet essential to water quality. Alternative
effluent control strategies, such as the transportation of effluents to other less affected
waters or the control of in-plant processes would have to be developed.
S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 46-47 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. supra
note 38, at 1464-65.
75. See 33 U.S.C. § 1312(b)(2) (1988) (allowing a person affected by an effluent limitation set
under § 1312 to not comply with that limitation if he or she can show that there is no reasonable
cost/benefit relationship).
76. See Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279, 1286 (D.S.D. 1979); see also
Mississippi Comm'n on Natural Resources v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269, 1276 (5th Cir. 1980) (hold-
ing that the EPA can override state WQSs by changing the effluent limits in NPDES permits
whenever a source interferes with water quality (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (1976)).
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tations set under sections 301 and 303 are found to be inadequate.77 Indeed,
this section of the CWA has never been used by the EPA.78 Congress did not
intend this section to "undercut ...the development of [WQSs] under sec-
tion 303 nor the imposition of section 301(b)(1)(C) of the [CWA]. ' '7 9 This
section was meant instead as a "supplemental" provision, directing the EPA
and the State to "impose effluent limitations which assure the attainment or
maintenance of water quality for the protection of public health, . . . fish,..
wildlife, and recreational activities ...where the adopted [WQSs] do not
assure the attainment and maintenance of such uses."80
In sum, section 302 provides the EPA with the authority to set more strin-
gent limitations than those previously set in a permit by a state or the EPA.
This is true even where the applicable WQSs are being met, but where those
WQSs are not assuring the "attainment or maintenance of' the desired water
quality."' However, as the legislative history indicates, only where permit con-
ditions are not stringent enough to meet the desired water quality will the
EPA hold a cost/benefit hearing and set limitations necessary to achieve the
desired water quality.
3. Section 303: Establishing WQSs and Requiring Federal Approval
a. Procedure
Section 303 was referred to by Congress as the "primary mechanism for the
development of State water quality standards and effluent limitations based on
them."8 2 Section 303 requires states to adopt WQSs for its navigable inter-
state and intrastate waters.83 States are also given the authority under this
section to establish effluent limitations and WQSs which are more stringent
77. Congress believed that § 303 standards should generally protect water quality and that
"[t]he [EPA] is to use the authority of section 302(a), however, where compliance with best
available technology requirements or the State [WQSs] process are not attaining this level of
water quality, due to point sources." S. REP. No. 50, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1985); see H.R.
REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 104 (1972), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
38, at 791; ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 25, § 12.05[3][c][ii]. The House report explains that
the EPA is required to establish more restrictive effluent limitations in the event the limitations set
under § 1311 are inadequate to preserve water quality. Congress also stated, "This section would
become operative only if the Congress, after study of the economic, social, and environmental
impact of the goals proposed for 1981, decides to implement those goals." H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 104 (1972), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. supra note 59, at 791.
78. See ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 25, § 12.05'[3][c][ii] (explaining that § 303 WQSs
should be used to achieve the CWA's goals).
79. S. REP. No. 50, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1985).
80. Id.; see also ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 25, § 12.05[3][c][ii] (discussing the legislative
history of § 302 of the CWA).
81. 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (1988); see ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 25, § 12.05[3][c][ii] n.336
(discussing the authority of the EPA under § 302 of the CWA).
82. S. REP. No. 50, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1985); see ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 25,
§ 12.05[3][c][i] (discussing § 303's requirement that the states set WQSs).
83. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(l)-(2) (1988).
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than the CWA's standards.84 The legislative history indicates, however, that
states are only permitted to consider economic factors in setting WQSs and
effluent limitations to the extent allowed by the EPA regulations implementing
section 303 of the CWA.8" The states are further required to hold public hear-
ings at least every three years for the purpose of reviewing those standards.86
If a state revises or adopts a new standard, the standard must be submitted to
the EPA for approval.8" The EPA does not hold hearings, or provide for prior
notice and comment, in its approval process.88
In reviewing state WQSs, the CWA requires the EPA to determine if the
WQS is "consistent with" the CWA's requirements.88 Once approved, the
WQS becomes the standard for the "applicable waters of that State" 90 and is
84. 40 C.F.R. § 131.4 (1990); see 33 U.S.C. § 1313(f) (1988); see also Homestake Mining Co.
v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279, 1283 (D.S.D. 1979) (discussing how §§ 1313 and 1370 of the CWA
combine to give states the authority to set more stringent limitations than the CWA requires).
85. S. REP. No. 50, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1985).
86. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1) (1988); see also 40 C.F.R. § 131.20(a)-(b) (1990) (requiring state
to hold public hearings). The public hearings are held in accordance with state law and according
to the provisions of Id. § 25 (1990). ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 25, § 12.03[2].
87. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2) (1988); see also 40 C.F.R. § 131.5 (1990) (giving the EPA
authority to review a state's WQSs); infra note 89 (listing the factors that federal regulations
require the EPA to apply in approving WQSs).
88. ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 25, § 12.03[2].
89. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3) (1988); see Mississippi Comm'n on Natural Resources v. Costle,
625 F.2d 1269, 1276 (5th Cir. 1980). Section 1313(c)(3) provides:
If the [EPA] determines that any such revised or new standard is not consistent with
the applicable requirements of this Act, he shall not later than the ninetieth day after
the date of submission of such standard notify the State and specify the changes to
meet such requirements. If such changes are not adopted by the State within ninety
days after the date of notification, the [EPA] shall promulgate such standard pursu-
ant to paragraph (4) of this subsection.
33 U.S.C. §1313(c)(3) (1988)
The EPA is directed to approve a state's WQSs if it determines that they are consistent with
factors listed in the federal regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 131.5 (1990). The factors are:
(a) Whether the State has adopted water uses which are consistent with the require-
ments of the Clean Water Act; (b) Whether the state has adopted criteria that pro-
tect the designated water uses; (c) Whether the State has followed its legal proce-
dures for revising or adopting standards; (d) Whether the State standards which do
not include the uses specified in section 101 (a)(2) of the Act are based upon appropri-
ate technical and scientific data and analysis, and (e) Whether the State submission
meets the requirements included in § 131.6 of this part. If EPA determines that State
water quality standards are consistent with the factors listed in paragraphs (a)
through (e) of this section, EPA approves the standards. EPA must disapprove the
State water quality standards and promulgate Federal standards under section
303(c)(4) of the [CWA], if State adopted standards are not consistent with the fac-
tors listed in paragraphs (a) through (e) of this section. EPA may also promulgate a
new or revised standard where necessary to meet the requirements of the Act.
id.
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3) (1988). WQSs "serve the dual purposes of establishing the water
quality goals for a specific water body and serve as the regulatory basis for the establishment of
water-quality-based treatment controls and strategies beyond the technology-based levels of treat-
ment required by sections 301(b) and 306 of the Act." 40 C.F.R. § 131.2 (1990).
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federally enforceable.91 If the EPA determines that the standard is not consis-
tent with the CWA, however, it must notify the state and recommend changes
to meet the CWA."' The EPA has the authority to promulgate standards for
the state if the state does not make the necessary changes.93
b. Scope of EPA's Authority in Approving WQSs
Courts discussing the EPA's authority to reject or approve a state's WQSs
recognize the significant role that Congress left to the states in declaring their
WQSs. 94 Nevertheless, the EPA still must review the standards and is "given
the final voice on the standard's adequacy." 8 The scope of the EPA's author-
ity varies depending upon the aspect of the WQSs in question. For instance,
the use designation in a WQS is generally tied to the zoning power that Con-
gress desired to leave with the states."6 However, establishing the scientific
criteria aspect of a WQS necessary to achieve the use designation set by a
state is considered to be a duty of the EPA.97 The EPA is the only entity able
to provide uniformity in setting the scientific criteria of a WQS." In addition,
the EPA has the authority to translate the CWA's broad statutory guidelines
into specifics that can be used to evaluate a state's proposed standard.99
The EPA's actions in approving or rejecting WQSs stands firm unless the
agency acted outside the scope of its authority, abused its discretion, or acted
arbitrarily or capriciously.100 In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
91. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 602 (10th Cir. 1990) (EPA-approved WQSs are feder-
ally enforceable).
92. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3) (1988). This section provides: "if the [EPA], within sixty days
after the date of submission of the revised or new standard, determines that such standard meets
the requirements of this Act, such standard shall thereafter be the water quality standard for the
applicable waters of that State." Id.
93. Id. § 1313(c)(3)-(4).
94. See, e.g., Mississippi Comm'n on Natural Resources v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269, 1275 (5th
Cir. 1980) (discussing state authority under § 1311 of the CWA); Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA,
477 F. Supp. 1279, 1284 (D.S.D. 1979) (discussing legislative history of the CWA); see also 33
U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1988) ("It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the
primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan
the development and use . . . of land and water resources .... ").
95. Mississippi Comm'n on Natural Resources, 625 F.2d at 1275.
96. Id. at 1276.
97. Id. The criteria must reflect the latest scientific knowledge. Id.; see supra notes 32-37 and
accompanying text (discussing WQSs).
98. See Mississippi Comm'n on Natural Resources, 625 F.2d at 1276.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1275. This standard of review comes from § 706 of the Administrative Procedures
Act ("APA"). See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). Judicial review of the EPA's actions is allowed by 33
U.S.C. § 1369(b) (1988). See Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275 (1981) (hold-
ing that the EPA's approval of a state's WQS was sufficiently explained in the record and EPA
had acted reasonably); Mississippi Comm'n on Natural Resources v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269, 1276
(5th Cir. 1980) (EPA's rejection of a state's WQS was reasonable where the state could not
justify having a WQS lower than minimum federal requirements).
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Costle,1° 1 a public interest group claimed that the EPA acted arbitrarily and
capriciously by approving a set of salinity WQSs that had no accountability
because they did not set specific numeric criteria.10'2 Noting that the arbitrary
and capricious standard of review is a deferential one which presumes an
agency'l actions to be valid, the court stated that it must affirm the EPA's
action if it found the decision had a rational basis, was the result of reasoned
decisionmaking, and was based on a consideration of the relevant factors.103
The court found that narrative WQSs were permissible under the CWA and
held that the salinity WQSs adequately met the requirements of the CWA
and that the EPA's decision was fully explained in the record.'04
When the state's WQSs are more stringent than those required by the EPA,
at least one court has stated that the EPA would violate the CWA by invali-
dating the WQSs.100 This was true even where the state had not considered
any economic or social factors in setting the WQSs. In Homestake Mining Co.
v. EPA, 06 the plaintiff argued that the EPA's approval of a state's WQSs,
which were more stringent than required by the CWA, was arbitrary and ca-
pricious.1 7 At that time, the federal regulations implementing section 303 re-
quired states to consider social and economic factors, among others, when set-
ting WQSs.'0 8 The court ruled that a state was free to assign each factor
whatever weight it desired and held that the EPA had "no power to disap-
prove these standards."'1 9 Thus, according to the court, the EPA is obligated
to approve a state's more stringent standards.
Once the EPA approves the state's WQSs, courts have held that the EPA
must incorporate those WQSs into permits and has no authority to set aside or
modify them. 10 For example, in United States Steel Corp. v. Train,"' an in-
101. 657 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
102. Id. at 287. The Environmental Defense Fund was concerned that the WQSs would not
adequately protect the waters. Id.
103. Id. at 283 (citing Bowman Transp. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 290
(1974); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971); American Radio
Relay League v. FCC, 617 F.2d 875, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34
(D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976)).
104. Id. at 288.
105. Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279, 1283 (D.SD. 1979).
106. 477 F. Supp. 1279 (D.S.D. 1979).
107. Id. at 1282.
108. 40 C.F.R. § 130.17(c)(1) (1979). Current federal regulations no longer provide for the
consideration of social and economic factors and instead require that the WQSs be based only on
scientific and technological factors. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.10 (1990).
109. Homestake Mining Co., 477 F. Supp. at 1284.
110. See, e.g., EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200,
219-20 (1976) (holding that a federal discharger was not required to obtain a state permit but
that the EPA is required to include the state's more stringent WQSs in the federal permit);
United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 835 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that the EPA had
no authority to set aside or modify a state's more stringent WQSs at a permit proceeding); Home-
stake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279, 1284 (D.S.D. 1979) (holding that the EPA had no
power to disapprove more stringent WQSs and was required by the CWA to include them in a
permit).
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dustrial point source challenged a permit issued by the EPA which incorpo-
rated the WQSs of the state in which the point source was located.' 12 The
point source unsuccessfully argued that the EPA should have determined the
validity of the state WQSs before making them applicable to the point
source.1 ' The court stated that the EPA's only authority with regard to a
state's WQSs is in determining whether they meet the section 303 requirement
of being "consistent with the applicable requirements of [the CWA]." Be-
cause the CWA does not give the EPA the authority to alter a state's WQSs
at a permit proceeding,"' the court held that the EPA correctly incorporated
the WQSs into the permit and that the EPA correctly refused to consider any
challenges of the WQSs' validity at the permit proceeding." 6
The above cases involved the approval and application of more stringent
WQSs with respect to in-state sources. Thus, these cases left unclear whether
an out-of-state discharger will prevail in arguing that the EPA's approval of
an affected state's more stringent WQSs is arbitrary and capricious because it
did not consider economic and social factors relevant to the source state.117
In ascertaining the success of an out-of-state discharger's claim that an af-
fected state's WQSs are too stringent, an analogy can be drawn from the situ-
ation where the EPA has rejected the WQSs submitted by a state because
they were too low." 8 In Mississippi Commission on Natural Resources v.
Costle," I a state agency argued that the EPA's rejection of its state WQSs
was arbitrary and capricious because the EPA failed to consider relevant eco-
Il1. 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977).
112. Id. at 831-32.
113. Id. at 835.
114. Id. at 836.
115. See infra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing the EPA's duty under § 402).
116. United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 835 (7th Cir. 1977).
117. But see International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 490-91 (1987) (stating in
dicta that an affected state only has an advisory role in regulating pollution from out-of-state
sources); Milwaukee I1, 451 U.S. 304, 328 (1981) (stating in dicta that states cannot regulate
other states); Milwaukee III, 731 F.2d 403, 413-14 (1984) (stating that § 510 does not give states
the right to impose more stringent standards on out-of-state sources). For example, the Milwau-
kee II Court stated:
It is one thing, however, to say that States may adopt more stringent limitations
through state administrative processes, or even that States may establish such limita-
tions through state nuisance law, and apply them to in-state dischargers. It is quite
another to say that the States may call upon federal courts to employ federal com-
mon law to establish more stringent standards applicable to out-of-state dischargers.
Milwaukee !!, 451 U.S. at 327-28 (emphasis in original). Milwaukee I1, Milwaukee 11, and
Ouellette restricted the rights of the states to apply state or federal common law remedies.
Oklahoma involves the application of neither state nor federal common law but rather the appli-
cation of WQSs set under the CWA. The Oklahoma court considered Milwaukee Ill and Ouel-
lette in its decision but dismissed them as being factually distinguishable and stating no more than
dicta. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 607 (10th Cir. 1990). See infra notes 271-79 and accom-
panying text (discussing the Oklahoma court's treatment of these cases).
118. See Mississippi Comm'n on Natural Resources v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1980).
119. Id.
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nomic factors.' 20 The court articulated the test to determine if the EPA's ac-
tions were arbitrary or capricious as "whether the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error
of judgment. . . . [T]he ultimate standard of review is a narrow one."'' In
keeping with the use/criteria distinction, the court noted that the EPA plays a
more dominant role in reviewing a WQS's scientific criteria aspect compared
to its use aspect.'22 The court supported this conclusion by noting that the
CWA requires the EPA to develop and publish water quality criteria "reflect-
ing the latest scientific technology."'1 28 Furthermore, the court pointed out that
when Congress wanted economics and cost to be considered in setting effluent
limitations, it explicitly required it. 2 " The court also stated that when the
WQS's criteria cannot be economically achieved, the state can effectively
lower the WQS criteria by reducing the use designation of the WQS. For
example, Mississippi could have reduced the use designation from fishable-
swimmable water to industrial use. The WQS criteria necessary to meet that
use would not have to be as stringent as that for fishable-swimmable water.2 5
Therefore, the court held that the EPA did not have to consider economic
factors when rejecting and setting new WQSs.12 6 Indeed, the court stated that
only scientific and technical factors seem to be of real relevance to the EPA's
consideration of a state's WQS criteria.' 27
In short, section 303 is a state's primary source of authority for regulating
its waters under the CWA. By establishing WQSs and having the EPA ap-
120. Id. at 1277. The EPA requested Mississippi to revise its dissolved oxygen WQS. Id. at
1273. Mississippi refused, choosing instead a standard of 5.0 milligrams per liter (mg/L) with an
allowance during low water periods of 4.0 mg/L. Id. The EPA rejected the state's WQS and
instead established a WQS requiring a minimum average dissolved oxygen concentration of 5.0
mg/L at all times. Id. at 1274.
121. Id. at 1277 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971)).
122. Id. at 1276.
123. Id. at 1277 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1) (1976)). Section 1314(a)(1) of the CWA pro-
vides, in part: "The [EPA], after consultation with appropriate Federal and State agencies and
other interested persons, shall develop, and publish . . . criteria for water quality accurately re-
flecting the latest scientific knowledge .... " 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(I) (1988).
124. See Mississippi Comm'n on Natural Resources v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269, 1277 (5th Cir.
1980) (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2)(A), 1312(b), 1314(b) (1976)).
125. Id. The process of lowering a use designation for a body of water is known as "downgrad-
ing." Id.
126. Id.; see E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 134-35 (1976). In Missis-
sippi, the EPA rejected a state's WQS criteria and set WQS criteria appropriate for the use
declared by the state. The state complained that the WQS was too stringent and the EPA did not
consider the economic impact of the WQS. Mississippi Comm'n on Natural Resources, 625 F.2d
at 1277. The court found that the EPA did not have to consider the economic impact when setting
criteria, noting that where a state cannot achieve the criteria required by the CWA, its remedy is
to designate the water for a less restrictive use. Id.
127. Mississippi Comm'n on Natural Resources, 625 F.2d at 1277. The current federal rules
regarding the authority of the EPA to approve a state's WQSs do not mention any factors that
reflect the economic interests of other states. See supra note 89 (discussing the factors that the
EPA is required by 40 C.F.R. § 131.5 to apply in approving WQSs).
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prove them, a state creates federally enforceable WQSs. The EPA's approval
or rejection of a state's WQSs is reviewable, however, only to a limited ex-
tent." 8 Thus, partly for uniformity reasons," 9 the EPA still largely controls
the adequacy of a WQS. However, the EPA has no authority to disapprove a
state's more stringent WQSs, nor does it have the authority to modify or alter
those standards when granting a discharge permit. Furthermore, the criteria
aspect of a WQS must merely reflect the latest scientific technology. There-
fore, the EPA does not have to consider economic factors when approving
WQSs. 130
4. Section 401: The Certification Requirement and Duty to Notify Affected
States
Section 401 requires a point source discharger to obtain a certification from
the source state certifying that the discharge will comply with all applicable
effluent limitations and standards of the CWA. 131 This section further provides
that no permit may be granted until this certification is obtained.1"2 Congress
amended this section in 1977 to expressly add section 303 WQSs to the list of
CWA provisions in which a state must certify compliance by the discharger.1 33
Noting that all states have EPA-approved WQSs, Congress believed it was
reasonable for the CWA to require federal permits and licenses to take into
account state WQSs adopted under section 303.134
The state agency granting discharge permits must notify the EPA as soon as
the agency receives an application and certification for a permit.135 If the EPA
determines that the discharge may affect the quality of the waters of another
state, "so as to violate any water quality requirement in such State," the EPA
must notify the potentially affected state. 186 The potentially affected state will
be granted a hearing with the permit agency upon request. 3 7 The permit
agency, "based on the recommendations of [the affected state], the [EPA],
128. See supra notes 94-127 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of review of the
EPA's authority).
129. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (stating that the EPA is best able to provide
uniformity in setting WQS criteria).
130. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text (comparing the criteria and use aspects of a
WQS).
131. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988); see also ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 25, § 12.05[2][b] (dis-
cussing certification requirements under the CWA); F. SKILLERN, supra note 30, at 167 (discuss-
ing permits and certification under the CWA). The certification is obtained either from the state
(or the state agency having jurisdiction over the water at issue), or the EPA where the state or its
agencies do not have authority to give the certificate. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1988).
132. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1988).
133. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 64, 91 Stat. 1566, 1599 (1977).
134. S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 72-73, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4326, 4397-98.
135. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1988).
136. Id.
137. Id.; see also F. SKILLERN. supra note 30, § 4.17 (discussing permit certification
requirements).
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and upon any additional evidence . . . shall condition . . . [a] permit in such
manner as may be necessary to insure compliance with applicable water qual-
ity requirements."1 8 If conditions cannot be set that assure that the discharge
will comply with a WQS, the permit will not be issued."'
5. Section 402: The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
Section 402 creates the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES"). 140 Through the NPDES, the standards established under the
CWA become obligations of individual point source dischargers."4' The EPA
issues discharge permits, through the NPDES, to point source dischargers.1 42
The CWA makes the discharge of any pollutant into navigable waters without
a permit unlawful. 148 Individual states, however, may establish their own per-
mit system if they can meet certain requirements of the CWA.144 For exam-
ple, a state program must have the ability and authority to issue permits that
will conform with the requirements of the CWA, to modify or terminate the
permits, and to provide adequate procedural safeguards such as notice of a
permit application to the EPA, the public, and any potentially affected
138. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1988); see F. SKILLERN, supra note 30, § 4.17. Some courts and
commentators, as well as the State of Arkansas in Oklahoma v. EPA, believed that the role of the
affected state was limited to making "recommendations." E.g., International Paper Co. v. Ouel-
lette, 479 U.S. 481, 490 (1987); see V. YANNACONE, B. COHEN & S. DAVISON, supra note 59, §
5:5; infra note 249 and accompanying text (discussing Arkansas' argument that an affected state
is limited to advising and making recommendations to the permit agency). The language of §
1341 is internally inconsistent because it refers to "recommendations" of the affected state, but
then states that the EPA "shall" condition the permits to "insure" compliance with applicable
WQSs. See also 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(5) (1988) (an affected state "may submit written recom-
mendations to the permitting State" (emphasis added)).
139. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2) (1988).
140. Id. § 1342; see F. SKILLERN, supra note 30, § 4.18.
141. F. SKILLERN, supra note 30, § 4.18; see also EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Re-
sources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 (1976) (stating that federal and state standards are trans-
formed into individual point source obligations through discharge permits). Permits may be issued
if the discharge will meet all applicable requirements under the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)
(t988).
142. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1988).
143. Id. § 1311(a); see also ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 25, § 12.05[2][a] (discussing §
1311); V. YANNACONE, B. COHEN & S. DAVISON, supra note 59, § 5:11 (interpreting § 1311). A
point source is required to obtain a permit only from the state in which it is located, even if its
discharge is into an interstate water that may affect the water of another state. Tennessee v.
Champion Int'l Corp., 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1371 (Tenn. 1986); V. YANNACONE. B. COHEN
& S. DAVISON, supra note 59, § 5:11.
144. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1988). Currently, 37 jurisdictions have EPA-approved programs.
See Cherney & Wardzinski, State and Federal Roles Under the Clean Water Act, I NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENVTL. J. 19 (1986) (examining the balance of state and federal authority under the
CWA). The EPA retains the authority to oversee, including the power to veto, the permits issued
by a state program and the program in general. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)-(d) (1988); see also
District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing the role of state
and federal government under the CWA); F. SKILLERN, supra note 30, § 4.18 (same).
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state." 5
Before issuing a permit to a discharger, the EPA, or a state having a permit
program, must give notice and an opportunity to be heard to those states that
may be affected by the discharger's effluent. " 6 The EPA is required to condi-
tion permits so that the discharges will meet the requirements of section
301."" Issued permits are fixed for five-year terms" and can be terminated or
modified for cause, including violation of a permit condition or a change in
any condition that requires either a temporary or permanent reduction or
elimination of the permitted discharge." 9
A state permit program is administered under the state's own legal author-
ity. However, in order to insure that the state program provides at least the
federal minimum protection, the CWA requires the EPA to review a state's
program to insure its compliance with the requirements of section 402.150 The
EPA may revoke a state program which is not in accordance with this sec-
tion.' 5 1 Permits issued either by the EPA or by an approved state agency are
145. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(l)(A)(4)-(5) (1988). Section 402(b) provides:
The [EPA] shall approve each such submitted program unless he determines that
adequate authority does not exist: (1) To issue permits which- (A) apply, and insure
compliance with, any applicable requirements of sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317 and
1343 of [the CWA] . . . (2)(A)(4) To insure that the [EPA] receives notice of each
application (including a copy thereof) for a permit . . . (5) To insure that any State
(other than the permitting State) whose waters may be affected . . . may submit
written recommendations to the permitting State ....
Id.
Additionally, a state permit program is required to apply limitations at least as stringently as
the federal standards. Id. § 1342(c). This underscores the importance Congress placed on national
consistency in preventing "pollution shopping." See Cherney & Wardzinski, supra note 144, at
19.
146. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a)(2) & 1342(b)(5) (1988). Any applicant for a federal permit must
first file a certificate of compliance with the permit agency, either the EPA or the applicant's state
permit agency. After receipt of the application and the certification, the permit agency must then
notify the EPA, which will determine if the discharge may affect the waters of another state. Id. §
1341.
147. Id. § 1342(a)(1); see United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 835 (7th Cir.
1977) (discussing the EPA's authority to set aside state WQSs in a permit procedure). Section
301(b)(l)(C) of the CWA provides:
[TIhere shall be achieved . . . any more stringent limitation, including those neces-
sary to meet [WQSs] . . . established pursuant to any State law or regulations
(under authority preserved by section [510] of this title) or any other Federal law or
regulation, or required to implement any applicable [WQS] established pursuant to
this chapter.
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(l)(C) (1988).
148. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(B) (1988). Thus, a discharger must reapply whenever its permit
expires.
149. Id. § 1342(b)(1)(C)(i), (iii).
150. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(2) (1988); see Cherney & Wardzinski, supra note 144, at 19 (dis-
cussing state and federal roles under the CWA). The EPA retains oversight authority with respect
to individual permits and the permit program in general. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)-(d) (1988).
151. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (1988). The EPA is required to hold a public hearing, notify the
state, and make public the reasons for the revocation. Id.
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equivalent and subject to the same requirements under the CWA.5 2 The EPA
always has the power to veto any state-issued permits.1"8 The federal court of
appeals has the power to review the EPA veto or approval of state permit
decisions.""4
In short, section 402 creates the NPDES permit system through which the
standards established under the CWA become obligations of individual dis-
chargers. Section 402 allows a state to administer its own permit system, but
the state must run it pursuant to CWA requirements.""' Finally, the EPA al-
ways has the power to veto any state-issued permits.
6. Section 309.: Federal Enforcement
Section 309 grants the EPA the power to enforce the CWA whenever it
receives information that any person is violating a condition of the CWA.' 5
Not only does an affected state have the ability to compel the EPA to enforce
the requirements of a permit,' 57 but it may also have the ability under this
section to have the EPA assess civil penalties against an out-of-state permit
violator.'58
The actions that the EPA can take against a party in violation of the CWA
include a compliance order, 59 civil action (including a permanent or tempo-
rary injunction),' 60 criminal penalties, 16' civil penalties, 62 and administrative
penalties.' 6 Courts interpreting section 309 generally recognize that the
EPA's duty to issue a compliance order is nondiscretionary.'6 ' The EPA may
152. See id. § 1342(a)(3); F. SKILLERN, supra note 30, § 4.18.
153. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (1988); see also ENVTL. LAW INST.. supra note 25, § 12.05[2] [d] [iii]
(discussing the EPA's oversight of state permit agencies).
154. District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The EPA's veto
authority is given by 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (1988). The EPA's exercise of discretion is subject to
judicial review under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Champion Int'l Corp. v. EPA, 25
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1878 (W.D.N.C. 1987); see also V. YANNACONE, B. COHEN & S.
DAVISON, supra note 59, § 5:11 (discussing the EPA's authority over state permit agencies).
155. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements that a state
must satisfy in order to have its own permit agency).
156. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) (1988).
157. Id. § 1319(a)(3); see also id. § 1365(h) (authorizing the governor of an affected state to
bring suit against the EPA to enforce an effluent violation occurring in another state but having
an impact in his state).
158. Id. § 1319(d).
159. Id. § 1319(a)(3).
160. Id. § 1319(b).
161. Id. § 1319(c).
162. Id. § 1319(d).
163. Id. § 1319(g).
164. See, e.g., South Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118, 134 (D.S.C.
1978) (holding that the EPA is only required to issue a compliance order and may bring enforce-
ment actions of civil or criminal suit upon its discretion); United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp.,
391 F. Supp. 1181, 1183-84 (D. Ariz. 1975) (holding that the EPA clearly must issue an abate-
ment order in the case of a violation); see also S. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1972),
reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 59, at 314 (upon finding a violation, this section
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bring other actions at its discretion.16
If the EPA issues a compliance order, the mandatory language of the CWA
would also require it to assess civil penalties for any person who then violates
the compliance order.1 66 In this roundabout way, an affected state can have
penalties assessed against an out-of-state point source. Thus, remedial alterna-
tive is important to an affected state under the CWA because it may not be
able to bring a "citizen" suit directly against a permit violator.167 If the assess-
ment of penalties under this section is a nondiscretionary duty of the EPA,
then the affected state can compel the EPA to assess them, thereby giving the
affected state some indirect control over an out-of-state polluter.168 An af-
fected state can, therefore, protect itself from an out-of-state permit violator
through actions brought by the EPA. "
7. Section 505: Civil Suits
Section 505 of the CWA allows "citizens" to bring civil suits against any
person in violation of an effluent limitation or an order issued by the EPA.1 7 0
Section 505 also authorizes the governor of an affected state to bring a civil
suit against the EPA for violations of an effluent standard occurring in another
state.17 1
"requires the EPA to either issue (a compliance] order ... or to bring a civil suit"); Id. at 174
(the EPA's duty to issue an abatement order remains a mandatory one). But see Sierra Club v.
Train, 557 F.2d 485, 490-91 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that 33 U.S.C. § 1319 imposes only a
discretionary duty to issue a compliance order).
165. See South Carolina Wildlife Fed'n, 457 F. Supp. at 134 (holding that the EPA is only
required to issue compliance order and may bring enforcement actions of civil or criminal suit
upon its discretion); see also I LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY, supra note 59, at 314 (upon finding a
violation, this section "requires the EPA to either issue [a compliance] order . . . or to bring a
civil suit").
166. Section 309(d) states that "any person who violates any order issued by the [EPA] under
subsection (a) of this section, shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $25,000 per day for
each violation." 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988) (emphasis added).
167. See infra notes 175-89 and accompanying text (discussing whether a state is a citizen for
purposes of § 505 civil suits).
168. See supra note 166.
169. The CWA mandates the EPA to take appropriate action when a violation of the CWA is
reported. Also, a state is not precluded from bringing civil action, under § 505, against the EPA to
compel it to act. Illinois ex rel. Scott v. Hoffman, 425 F. Supp. 71, 76-77 (S.D. III. 1977).
170. Section 505 of the CWA provides, in relevant part:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section .... any citizen may commence
a civil action on his own behalf-(I) against any person (including (i) the United
States, and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent per-
mitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in viola-
tion of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued
by the [EPA] or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or (2) against
the [EPA] where there is alleged a failure of the [EPA] to perform any act or duty
under this chapter which is not discretionary with the [EPA].
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988).
171. Id. § 1365(h).
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A NPDES permittee must submit a discharge monitoring report ("DMR")
to appropriate state and federal regulatory agencies. 17  The DMR is public
information173 and contains information on both the measured level of the pol-
lutants discharged and the appropriate NPDES standard 174 Thus, a citizen
has access to the information needed to determine if a permit violation is oc-
curring. 17  If a violation occurs, section 505 provides a citizen with the same
civil penalties available to the EPA under section 309(d). 17 6 Section 505 pro-
vides citizens with some incentive to bring citizen suits by awarding them liti-
gation costs upon the court's discretion in any action brought under section
505.'17
It appears, however, that an affected state is not a "citizen" for purposes of
this section. A "citizen" is defined by the CWA to be "a person or persons
having an interest which is or may be adversely affected. ' 78 The CWA de-
fines a "person" to include a state or political subdivision of a state.' 7 9 Read
literally, these provisions make a state a "citizen."" a0 However, courts that
have fully examined the question have found that a state is not a "citizen" for
purposes of applying this section."'
For example, in California v. Department of Navy,"2 the state of California
attempted to enforce penalties against the Navy for permit violations." a3 As
the court noted, section 505 provides that a "citizen" may not bring a suit if
172. 40 C.F.R. § 122.21(f)-(g) (1990).
173. 33 U.S.C. § 1318(b) (1988).
174. Note, Citizen Suits and the Clean Water Act: The Supreme Court Decision. in Gwaltney
of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 891, 896.
175. Id.
176. See supra notes 156-69 and accompanying text (discussing § 309 remedies); see also Mid-
dlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. I, 13-14 (1981) (dis-
cussing remedies available under § 505); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988) (giving district courts the
power to assess civil penalties provided under § 309(d)).
177. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1988).
178. Id. § 1365(g).
179. Id. § 1362(5).
180. Some courts have relied on the this literal language to hold that a state is a citizen. See
Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623, 631 (7th Cir. 1980); Massachusetts v. United
States Veterans Admin., 541 F.2d 119, 121 (Ist Cir. 1976).
181. See, e.g., California v. Department of Navy, 631 F. Supp. 584, 587 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
(state is not a "citizen"), aff'd on other grounds, 845 F.2d 222, 223 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988) (not
reaching issue of whether a state is a citizen); United States v. City of Hopewell, 508 F. Supp.
526, 528-29 (E.D. Va. 1980) (after full discussion of issue, finding that a state is not a "citizen").
Other courts have considered a state to be a citizen, but these courts did not fully examine or
analyze the issue. See Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d at 631 (relying merely on literal statu-
tory definitions to hold that a state is a citizen), vacated on other grounds, 453 U.S. 917 (1981);
United States Veterans Admin., 541 F.2d at 121 (holding that a state is a "citizen" but not
analyzing the issue, relying instead on statutory definitions); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Ruckel-
shaus, 99 F.R.D. 558, 560 (D.N.J. 1983) (relying on Massachusetts v. United States Veterans
Administration to hold that a state is a citizen).
182'. 631 F. Supp. 584 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
183. Id. at 585.
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the EPA or state is already diligently pursuing a remedy under the CWA.'84
The court found it unlikely that Congress intended a state to take advantage
of this section because it would be illogical to require a state to show that it is
not diligently pursuing a remedy before it is allowed to bring a suit under this
section. 8 Furthermore, the court reasoned that there would be little sense for
the citizen to be required to give notice to the state before the citizen files suit
if the state is in fact the citizen.186
The court found further support for finding that a state is not a citizen in
section 505(h).1 87 Section 505(h) authorizes a governor of an affected state to
commence a civil action against the EPA for its failure to enforce "an effluent
standard or limitation" which is being violated in another state and "causing a
violation of any water quality requirement in his State."18 8 Because a "citi-
zen" already has the authority to bring suits against the EPA for failing to
perform a nondiscretionary act or duty, the court believed that section 505(h)
would be superfluous if a state were considered a citizen. 88 Thus, a state is
probably not a citizen for the purposes of this section.
8. Section 510: State Authority Under the CWA
Section 510 gives states the authority to establish more stringent standards
than those required by the CWA.' 90 Courts have interpreted this section to
184. Id. at 587 (discussing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(I)(B) (1988)).
185. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 64 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1482 ("It should be noted that if the Federal, State, and local agen-
cies fail to exercise their enforcement responsibility, the public is provided the right to seek vigor-
ous enforcement action under the citizen suit provisions of section 505." (emphasis added)).
186. Department of Navy, 631 F. Supp. at 587.
187. Id.
188. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(h) (1988). In determining if a "water quality requirement" is being
violated, Congress has stated that effluent limitations are for preventing pollution and water qual-
ity is to be a measure of effectiveness. See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text (distinguish-
ing between WQSs and effluent limitations).
189. Department of Navy, 631 F. Supp. at 587. The court distinguished other decisions that
reached a contrary result, see supra note 181, primarily on the ground that the state's status as a
citizen was never a contested issue in those cases. Department of the Navy, 631 F. Supp at 588.
190. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 85-86 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 38, at 1503-04; see also International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 492-94
(1987) (noting that plaintiff cannot rely on state common law to set more stringent standards).
Section 510 provides:
Except as expressly provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall (I) preclude
or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof or interstate agency to
adopt or enforce (A) any standard or limitation respecting discharges of pollutants, or
(B) any requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution; except that if an
effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment
standard, or standard of performance is in effect under this chapter, such State or
political subdivision or interstate agency may not adopt or enforce any effluent limita-
tion, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or
standard of performance which is less stringent than the effluent limitation or other
limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of per-
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mean that the EPA has no authority to invalidate a state's WQSs, as applied
to an in-state source, for being too stringent.191 However, courts have also con-
cluded that this section does not authorize a state to use its own common law,
or federal common law, to set more stringent standards applicable to out-of-
state point sources. 192
For example, in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois ("Milwaukee 11"),'" Illinois
argued that section 510 gave it the authority to use the federal courts to im-
pose more stringent standards than required by the CWA. The Court recog-
nized that section 510 gave a state authority to establish more stringent stan-
dards than required by the CWA but held that a state could not use the
federal courts or federal common law to establish them.19 4
Likewise, in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee ("Milwaukee I11"),95 Illinois
sought relief against Milwaukee under Illinois state nuisance law.196 Illinois
argued that because the CWA preempted federal common law, state law
should no longer be preempted by federal common law in order to provide a
remedy to Illinois.197 The court, however, held that the CWA precluded a suit
under the common law of any state except the state in which the polluter was
located.198
The court in Milwaukee III ruled that while section 510 of the CWA pre-
serves the right of a state to set more stringent standards for in-state sources,
it does not give states the right to impose these more stringent standards on
out-of-state sources.19 9 The Milwaukee III court concluded that section 510
did not allow a state to use its own state law to impose more stringent stan-
dards on a out-of-state source.200
The issue of the EPA's ability to impose more stringent standards on an
out-of-state source was not before the court. The court recognized that the
formance under this chapter; or (2) be construed as impairing or in any manner af-
fecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (including
boundary waters) of such States.
33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1988).
191. See supra notes 94-127 and accompanying text (discussing the EPA's lack of authority to
disapprove a state's WQS as applied to sources within that state).
192. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 497 (holding that the CWA preempts state common law claims
except those arising under the common law of the source state); Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 327-
29 (1981) (holding that the CWA preempts federal common law); Milwaukee III, 731 F.2d 403,
413 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that Illinois could not rely on its own nuisance law against a Mil-
waukee discharger), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985); see infra notes 203-20 and accompanying
text (discussing the preemption cases).
193. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
194. Id. at 328.
195. 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985).
196. Id. at 405. Illinois was not attempting to enforce more stringent EPA-approved WQSs but
rather its own state law.
197. Id. at 406-07.
198. Id. at 406-09 & n.1.
199. Id. at 413-14.
200. The court believed that allowing a state to use § 510 to apply its common law to an out-of-
state source would lead to "chaotic confrontation between sovereign states." Id. at 414.
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federal nature of interstate water pollution required the application of uniform
federal standards to both protect an affected state from out-of-state point
sources and to equally apportion use of interstate waters.20 ' Furthermore, the
court realized that the CWA's comprehensive regulatory scheme was to pro-
vide the centralized forum necessary for resolving interstate water pollution
disputes and that Illinois' failure to follow the dictates of this regulatory
scheme resulted in their waters being insufficiently protected from out-of-state
point sources.212
In short, section 510, much like section 303, allows states to regulate their
waters. Section 510 allows a state to establish more stringent WQSs than
those required by the EPA under the CWA. However, as Milwaukee H and
Milwaukee III point out, section 510 does not preserve any state or federal
common law right to set more stringent standards against out-of-state sources.
B. The Preemption Cases
As a result of Milwaukee H and the Court's more recent decision in Inter-
national Paper Company v. Ouellette,'2 3 collectively termed the "preemption
cases,"2 4 the CWA has become the controlling source of law in water regula-
tion. Milwaukee H involved the polluting of Illinois' Lake Michigan waters by
the City of Milwaukee.205 Illinois sought to use federal common law to impose
stricter standards than those applied to Milwaukee under the CWA. 206 The
Supreme Court held, however, that the CWA supplanted federal common
law.20 Thus, an affected state could not look to the federal common law for a
remedy against the source state, The Court reasoned that Congress' involve-
ment in an area of the law removes the need for common law remedies.20 8 The
Court also noted that Congress had created a comprehensive scheme of statu-
tory remedies and the federal courts should not supplement those remedies
with federal common law. 20 9 Although the CWA expressly authorizes states to
adopt standards more stringent than those prescribed in the CWA, the Court
201. Id. at 410-1I.
202. The court identified the essence of the problem, stating:
Illinois' basic grievance is that the permits issued to Milwaukee pursuant to the
[CWA] do not impose stringent enough controls on the discharges. Nevertheless, Illi-
nois failed to participate in the permit issuing process when the Milwaukee permits
were issued. . . .[Tihat process seems now to be the appropriate federal forum for
adjusting the competing claims of states in the environmental quality of interstate
waters.
Id. at 412-13 n.5 (citation omitted).
203. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
204. These cases are referred to as the preemption cases because they held that the CWA
preempts federal and state common law remedies. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
205. Milwaukee I!, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); see also Note, supra note 2, at 213 (discussing the
facts and holding of Milwaukee I).
206. See Note, supra note 2, at 214.
207. Milwaukee I1, 451 U.S. at 317.
208. Id. at 314; see Note, supra note 2, at 215-17.
209. Milwaukee II. 451 U.S. at 319.
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interpreted this power to apply only with regard to in-state polluters. 10
In Ouellette, a group of Vermont property owners filed a state common law
nuisance suit against a New York discharger, alleging that a paper company's
discharge of various pollutants into nearby Lake Champlain was a nuisance.2 11
They also alleged that the discharger had violated its permit given under the
CWA, and sought damages and an injunction.2 1 2 The discharger moved to
dismiss the nuisance claim based on the Milwaukee II holding. The Supreme
Court held that a private nuisance suit could be maintained in a Vermont
federal court against an out-of-state polluter, but the nuisance law of the
source state, New York, must be applied.2 1 8 According to the Court, applying
the common law of the source state was consistent with the structure of the
CWA.214
The Court was concerned that the application of the affected state's law
would result in one state indirectly regulating the conduct of out-of-state
sources.215 In addition, the Court believed that the application of the poten-
tially conflicting laws of many states would undermine the permit scheme of
the CWA.2 6 The Court stated that its holding did not leave an affected state
without a remedy because it could pursue a nuisance claim under the law of
the source state.21" The Court noted that the CWA prevents only those actions
which seek to establish standards of effluent control that differ from those es-
tablished under the CWA.218
In Ouellette, the Supreme Court attempted to outline the roles that the
source state and affected states play in the CWA. In dicta, the Court stated
that an affected state plays a lesser role in regulating interstate water under
the CWA than a source state. 19 Despite recognizing that the affected state
may be harmed by an out-of-state discharge, the Court still believed that an
affected state "only has an advisory role in regulating pollution that originates
210. Id. at 327-28; see also Milwaukee I11, 731 F.2d 403, 413 & n.7 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding
that § 510(2) preserves the right of a state to regulate discharges into its own waters but does not
allow the state to exercise jurisdiction over activities occurring outside its boundaries, even if those
activities pollute the waters of the state); Hill, Preemption of State Common Law Remedies by
Federal Environmental Statutes: International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 541, 546
(1987) (discussing the Ouellette Court's decision).
211. Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264, 266 (D. Vt.), afd per curiam,
776 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1985), afid in part and rev'd in part, 479 U.S. 481 (1987); see also Hill,
supra note 210, at 546-47 (discussing the Ouellette case from its inception).
212. See Hill, supra note 210, at 546-47.
213. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 494. 'The Court followed much of the reasoning of the Seventh
Circuit in Milwaukee III. See Hill, supra note 210, at 551 (discussing the Supreme Court's
opinion).
214. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 492-94.
215. Id. at 495.
216. Id. at 494-96.
217. Id. at 497.
218. Id. This is the feared double permitting that Congress and the Court condemns. See Hill,
supra note 210, at 552-53 (discussing the Ouellette court's reasoning).
219. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 490.
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beyond its borders." '20
In short, as a result of the preemption cases, the only common law remedies
available to an affected state are actions under the laws of the state where the
discharger is located. For example, Illinois can file suit against a Wisconsin
discharger under Wisconsin nuisance law. However, as a result of the preemp-
tion cases, Illinois no longer has a federal common law cause of action. More-
over, the CWA seemed to provide an affected state with little power beyond
an "advisory" role in controlling pollution entering its state from out-of-state
dischargers.22' Section 510 clearly gives a state authority to set more stringent
WQSs than those required under the CWA with respect to in-state sources. 2
However, until Oklahoma v. EPA, it had not been decided whether a state's
federal statutory authority under the CWA to set more stringent WQSs for its
waters also applied to out-of-state sources.
II. OKLAHOMA v. EPA
A. The Facts and Procedural History
The City of Fayetteville, Arkansas applied to the EPA for an NPDES per-
mit which would allow the city's new wastewater treatment plant to discharge
into a tributary of the Illinois River, an Arkansas-Oklahoma interstate
stream.223 The Illinois River crosses the state line into Oklahoma thirty-nine
miles downstream from the waste treatment plant.2 24 The segment of the Illi-
nois River starting at the Arkansas-Oklahoma border has been designated an
Oklahoma state scenic river and was to be considered for addition to the Na-
tional Wild and Scenic Rivers System.225
The State of Oklahoma, along with Save the Illinois River, a nonprofit
group, requested denial of the permit because they did not believe the permit
conditions were stringent enough to meet many of Oklahoma's WQSs, includ-
ing its dissolved oxygen, phosphorous, and turbidity WQSs.'2 6 Both Oklahoma
and Arkansas requested and were granted an evidentiary hearing concerning
the permit by an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ").227 The ALJ determined
220. Id. The Court further stated:
lAin affected State does not have the authority to block the issuance of the permit if
it is dissatisfied with the proposed standards. An affected State's only recourse is to
apply to the EPA Administrator, who then has the discretion to disapprove the permit
if he concludes that the discharges will have an undue impact on interstate waters.
Id. at 490-91.
221. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text (discussing dicta from the Ouellette deci-
sion which indicates that an affected state has only an advisory role in the permit process).
222. See supra notes 190-202 and accompanying text (discussing a state's power to set more
stringent WQSs than required under the CWA).
223. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 597 (10th Cir. 1990).
224. Id. at 598.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 597-98, 616-18.
227. Id. at 597. Evidentiary hearing requests are allowed under 40 C.F.R. § 124.74-.91 (1990).
More formalized mechanisms may also apply under 40 C.F.R. § 124.111-.128 (1990).
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that Arkansas would have to comply with Oklahoma's WQSs but concluded
that the permit would not have an undue impact on or violate Oklahoma's
WQSs.2 28 Both parties appealed the decision. 29 Oklahoma, and the nonprofit
group, believed the AU erred in concluding the discharge, as permitted,
would not violate Oklahoma WQSs. °30 Arkansas argued that the EPA had no
authority to require an Arkansas discharger to meet Oklahoma WQSs. 22 The
decision was upheld by the Chief Judicial Officer.2 32 The EPA then approved
Arkansas' permit a.2 3 Both states petitioned the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
for review of the EPA's actions.2 84
In its petition, Oklahoma contended that the EPA erred in concluding that
the discharge allowed by the permit would not violate their WQSs.235 Arkan-
sas again challenged the EPA's authority to require an Arkansas discharger to
comply with Oklahoma WQSs.136 The Tenth Circuit granted Oklahoma's peti-
tion and framed the fundamental issue as whether the CWA required a point
source of pollution to comply with the WQSs of all affected downstream
states.2
37
B. The Tenth Circuit's Analysis
The Tenth Circuit sided with Oklahoma and held that a discharger must
comply with the WQSs of affected downstream states and the EPA's approval
of the permit was arbitrary and capricious because the permit issued was not
sufficiently conditioned to meet those WQSs.2"8 In a lengthy opinion, the court
examined the CWA as a whole, along with its legislative history, and con-
cluded that no point source could discharge into a navigable water unless the
point source complied with all applicable water quality requirements, includ-
ing the federally-approved WQSs of affected downstream states.239 The court
was influenced in its decision by the EPA's argument that achieving down-
stream WQSs would be nearly impossible if the out-of-state discharger did not
228. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 597 (10th Cir. 1990).
229. Id. An appeal to the EPA is allowed under 40 C.F.R. § 124.91 (1990). The case is named
Oklahoma v. EPA because, even though Oklahoma and Arkansas have opposing views, both are
seeking judicial review of the EPA's permit decision.
230. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 597. The court devotes the last half of its opinion to an examina-
tion of the extensive factual record compiled in this case. Id. at 615-35. Because Oklahoma sought
to have the EPA deny the permit before any actual discharge took place, much of the evidence
was based on sophisticated computer models. Id. at 607, 626-34.
231. Id. at 597.
232. Id. Both the Chief Judicial Officer ("CJO") and the AU interpreted the CWA to require
an out-of-state source to meet the WQSs of a downstream affected state. Id. at 603.
233. Id. at 598.
234. Federal circuit courts of appeals have authority to review the EPA's granting of a permit
under 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (1988).
235. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 597 (10th Cir. 1990).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 601.
238. Id. at 633-634.
239. Id. at 615.
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have to comply with an affected state's WQSs.140 Although the court recog-
nized the traditional bounds of state sovereignty, it ultimately concluded that
its decision did not allow one state to regulate another because the EPA-ap-
proved WQSs are federal law."4 '
1. Standard of Review
The court initially discussed the proper standard of review under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. 42 The court concluded that it must uphold the
agency's actions, findings, and conclusions unless they were outside the
agency's statutory authority, were not supported by substantial evidence, or
were arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accor-
dance with law. 24 1 Furthermore, the court noted that both it and the EPA
must uphold the clearly expressed intent of Congress. 244 However, if the stat-
ute is ambiguous, the court stated that the agency responsible for administer-
ing the statute, the EPA, is entitled to substantial deference. 245 Where a stat-
ute is ambiguous and the EPA's interpretation is reasonable, the agency's
construction should be upheld unless it conflicts with the congressional policies
underlying the CWA. 24 1
2. The Opposing Views
Arkansas argued that neighboring states did not have to comply with one
240. Id. at 606.
241. Id. at 606 n.9.
242. Id. at 598-99. The court went on to discuss two procedural matters. The EPA had argued
that Arkansas lacked standing to challenge the EPA's interpretation of the CWA because, by not
challenging any terms of the permit, it failed to state a justiciable case or controversy. Id. at 599.
The court relied on § 509 of the CWA and its legislative history to determine that Arkansas was
an "interested person" eligible to obtain review of an EPA permit action in the federal circuit
courts of appeal. Id. at 599-600. In a footnote, the court pointed out that it could reach the
statutory interpretation issue even if it did not find that Arkansas had standing because, under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988), the court has authority to determine
whether the EPA acted within its statutory authority. Oklahoma. 908 F.2d at 600 n.3.
The court also had to consider whether Arkansas exhausted its administrative remedies. No
parties raised this issue, but the court noted that Arkansas may have failed to comply with the
technical requirements of EPA regulations for appeals. Id. at 600-01. Arkansas did not file a
petition for review of the ALJ's initial decision as required by 40 C.F.R. § 124.91(e) (1990). Also,
the court believed that the EPA's action "was arguably not 'complete' with respect to the Arkan-
sas parties because the CJO failed to 'issue an order either granting or denying [Arkansas'] peti-
tion for review' " as required by 40 C.F.R. § 124.91(c)(1). Id. at 601. However, the court did not
deny Arkansas' appeal because the EPA's position on the present issue had been clear since the
initial decision by the AU and Arkansas' position was directly opposed to it. Id.
243. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 598 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A),
(C), (E) (1988)).
244. Id. at 599.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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another's WQSs. 2' The Oklahoma court pointed out that Arkansas' view
would give an upstream state the ability, if not the legal right, to control the
quality of downstream waters in another state by discharging into interstate
waters and having to only comply with its own WQSs.248 Arkansas contended
that sections 401 and 402 limited an affected state's role to merely advising
and making recommendations on an out-of-state discharger's permit.2 4 9 Ar-
kansas argued that Congress did not authorize affected states, such as
Oklahoma, to impose their WQSs upon a discharger in another state.250
The EPA, on the other hand, argued that Arkansas was required to comply
with federal law, and specifically, Oklahoma's EPA-approved WQSs. 21 The
EPA contended that in interstate disputes, the only applicable WQSs are those
approved by the EPA under the CWA and that in intrastate disputes, a state
may impose more stringent WQSs that need not be approved by the EPA. 52
In this way, a state is free to regulate its waters with regard to in-state pol-
luters with minimal federal involvement.
Finding that the CWA did not clearly express Congress' intent on this issue,
the court turned to the EPA's interpretation. The court found it significant
that the EPA's interpretation had not been adopted specifically for this pro-
ceeding but was consistent with its long-standing CWA-implementing regula-
tions. 53 The court acknowledged that it normally must give deference to the
consistent interpretation of a statute by the agency entrusted with its adminis-
tration. However, the court found it necessary to examine the CWA as a
whole before concluding that the EPA's interpretation, requiring Arkansas to
comply with Oklahoma's WQSs, was reasonable and consistent with Con-
gress's policies behind the CWA.2 5 4
3. The Parties' Statutory Arguments
The EPA relied heavily on section 301(b)(1)(C), which provides:
In order to carry out the objective of this chapter, there shall be achieved
. . . not later than July 1, 1977, any more stringent limitation, including
those necessary to meet water quality standards . . . established pursuant to
247. Id. at 602.
248. Id.
249. Id.; see supra notes 135-55 and accompanying text (discussing §§ 401(a)(2) and
402(b)(5) of the CWA).
250. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 602 (10th Cir. 1990).
251. Id. at 603. In the evidentiary hearings, both the AU and the CJO interpreted the CWA
to require out-of-state sources to meet an affected state's WQSs. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 604. The implementing regulation, 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d), provides: "No permit may
be issued: . . . (d) When the imposition of conditions cannot ensure compliance with the applica-
ble water quality requirements of all affected states." 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (1990); see also id.
§ I 22.44(d)(4) (requiring permits to include any requirements necessary to conform to applicable
water quality requirements when the discharge affects another state); id. § 131.10(b) (requiring
state to ensure its WQSs will maintain WQSs of downstream states).
254. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 604.
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any State law or regulations ...or required to implement any applicable
water quality standard established pursuant to this chapter.255
Arkansas contended that this section was a mere timing provision, declaring
the date by which the necessary limitations had to be established.256 Arkansas
further argued that this section did not explain whether the "more stringent
limitation" must be achieved by dischargers in other states. Arkansas con-
cluded, therefore, that section 510 of the CWA should be read to limit the
reach of a state's stricter standards to discharges originating within the state
imposing those standards.2 5 7
The court rejected Arkansas' arguments. 58 Relying on legislative history
and case law, 259 the court pointed out that section 510 is a savings clause that
preserves the rights of the states to "set more restrictive standards than those
imposed by [the CWA]." 260 The court, recognizing that section 301 was one
of the CWA's crucial provisions, 26 1 concluded that Congress did not intend
section 510 to limit the scope of section 301 .262 The court also noted that the
relevant language of section 510 did not specifically restrict a state's right to
regulate pollution to only the waters within that state.26 3
More significantly, the court acknowledged that Arkansas' view was irra-
tional once "thoughtful consideration" was given to the language of section
301(b)(1)(C). 64 The mandate of section 301 is to establish limitations neces-
sary to meet applicable WQSs. 265 The court believed that in order to fulfill the
mandate of section 301(b)(1)(C), dischargers must meet the requirements of
affected states, as well as those of the source state.266 The court also pointed
255. Id. at 604-05.
256. Id. at 605.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Interestingly, the court cited International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 493
(1987), and Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 327-28 (1981), for the proposition that § 510 preserves
,the rights of the states to set more restrictive standards. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 605.
260. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 605 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting S. REP. No. 414, 92d
Cong., Ist Sess. 85 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. supra note 38, at 1503).
261. See supra notes 190-202 and accompanying text (discussing § 510).
262. Oklahoma. 908 F.2d at 605.
263. Id. at 606. Arkansas relied on the words "waters ... of such States" to limit the author-
ity of a state under § 510. Id. The court pointed out, however, that the limiting language relied by
Arkansas appears in subparagraph 2 and therefore cannot be construed as limiting the state's
rights preserved in subparagraph 1. Id. For the full text of § 510, see supra note 190. In a foot-
note, the court made clear that it was not suggesting that one state may directly regulate the
conduct of a point source in another state. The court stated:
Such exercise of jurisdiction would exceed traditional bounds of sovereignty. Nor does
the Act redefine those bounds to allow dual permitting. But the question posed here is
whether federal law embodied in the Clean Water Act requires a discharge permit to
insure compliance with the applicable WQSs of all affected states.
Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 606 n.9 (emphasis in original).
264. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 606.
265. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(I)(C) (1988).
266. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 606 (10th Cir. 1990). As the court correctly pointed
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out that businesses would engage in "pollution shopping" if dischargers were
not required to comply with a neighboring affected state's WQSs.26
Arkansas argued that requiring a source in one state to comply with the
WQSs of all downstream states would produce "chaotic" effects, making it
"virtually impossible to predict the standard for a lawful discharge into an
interstate body of water" and thus, undercuts the CWA's orderly regulatory
scheme.268 The court found little merit in this argument. The court noted that
the EPA's ability, as well as the authority, to require compliance with the
WQSs of affected downstream states is limited by the ability to measure a
source's impact on the water quality of that state.268
In short, the court rejected Arkansas' statutory arguments. The court was
not persuaded by Arkansas' attempt to characterize section 301 as a "mere
timing provision." The court also determined that Arkansas' hypothetically
"chaotic" regulatory scheme was undermined by a physical attenuation analy-
sis, which showed that the effects of a discharge become smaller as the dis-
tance and amount of water volume between the discharge and a downstream
state increase.270
4. Ouellette and Milwaukee III
Arkansas cited Ouellette and Milwaukee III to support its interpretation
that a state's power to set more stringent limitations under section 510 is lim-
ited to dischargers within that state.2 7' The court distinguished both cases by
out, "There could be no assurance of achieving a state's more stringent [WQSs] if an upstream,
out-of-state discharger were not required to comply with those standards." Id. Furthermore, the
court agreed with the EPA that "Arkansas's construction of the Act would make achieving down-
stream [WQSs] impossible in many circumstances or . . .possible . . . only by imposing a dispro-
portionate burden on dischargers located in the downstream state." Id.
267. Id. The court found that Congress intended to eliminate "pollution havens" by its enact-
ment of the 1972 amendments. Id. at 606 n.1 1; see also S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 73,
reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4326, 4398 ("The result might well be the
creation of pollution havens in some of those States which have approved permit programs. This
result is exactly what the 1972 amendments were designed to avoid.").
268. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 606.
269. Id. at 607. This is essentially a distance analysis. The impact of the discharge becomes
more attenuated with distance and water volume. See id. The further away a source is from a
state boundary, the lower the chance that its discharge will have an impact on the water quality of
that state. However, Arkansas' argument does have some merit when considered in an area such
as the Tennessee Mississippi River Valley where many state boundaries share common water
within close proximity. There is no "chaos" when only one state is affected, but this may not
always be the case. If there are four different EPA-approved standards, then the EPA would have
a more difficult time determining which standard is controlling. However, in such areas, the EPA,
in order to achieve the uniformity sought by the CWA, may set just one EPA-approved standard
after consulting with all the states involved.
270. It is for this reason that a Tennessee point source, for example, will not have to comply
with Louisiana WQSs.
271. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 607; see International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 493
(1987) (stating that the language of § 510 "limits the effect of the clause to discharges flowing
directly into a State's own waters." (emphasis in original)); Milwaukee 111, 731 F.2d 403 (7th
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noting that they involved one state trying to apply its own nuisance laws to a
discharger in another state.172  On the other hand, Oklahoma was a permit
action where one state was seeking to apply federal statutory law, namely the
EPA-approved WQSs under the CWA.27' The court quoted language from
Milwaukee III that distinguished between establishing more stringent stan-
dards for an out-of-state source using state law, which Milwaukee III prohib-
ited, and requiring an out-of-state source to comply with federal statutory law
(a state's EPA-approved WQSs).274
However, the court realized that some language in Ouellette did initially
seem to undercut the EPA's position. Specifically, the Ouellette Court stated,
"Even though it may be harmed by the discharges, an affected State only has
an advisory role in regulating pollution that originates beyond its borders
... -275 The Oklahoma court dismissed the language as dictum, emphasiz-
ing that Ouellette involved state common law while this case involved federal
law.2 76 The court also pointed to other dicta which mitigated the language
relied on by Arkansas: the Ouellette Court stated that nothing in its decision
affected the plaintiff's right to "pursue remedies that may be provided by the
[CWA]. 2 7 7 The court further supported its dismissal of Ouellette by noting
that the case was not concerned with how an affected states WQSs are intro-
duced in the CWA's permit process, but rather with preventing affected states
from circumventing that process via their own state law. 27 8 The court read the
Ouellette decision as seeking to protect the CWA's comprehensive approach
towards interstate water pollution by not allowing individual states to ignore
Cir. 1984) (section 1370 saves no more than the right of a state to regulate activity occurring
within the confines of its boundary waters), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985).
272. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 607 (10th Cir. 1990).
273. Id.
274. Id. The Milwaukee III court stated:
Illinois' basic grievance is that the permits issued to Milwaukee pursuant to the
[CWA] do not impose stringent enough controls .... Nevertheless, Illinois failed to
participate in the permit issuing process when the Milwaukee permits were is-
sued .... [T]hat process seems now to be the appropriate federal forum for adjust-
ing the competing claims of states in the environmental quality of interstate waters.
Milwaukee III, 731 F.2d 403, 412 n.5 (7th Cir. 1984).
275. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 490. The Ouellette Court stated:
While source States have a strong voice in regulating their own pollution, the CWA
contemplates a much lesser role for States that share an interstate waterway with the
source (the affected States). Even though it may be harmed by the discharges, an
affected State only has an advisory role in regulating pollution that originates beyond
its borders.
Id.
276. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 608.
277. Id. (quoting International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 498 n. 18 (1987)).
278. Id. The court pointed out that the concern in Ouellette was undermining the comprehen-
sive structure Congress developed in the CWA. Id. at 608-09 (citing Ouellette. 479 U.S. at 497).
The Ouellette Court believed that § 510 did not empower a state "to impose separate discharge
standards" under its state common law because this would undermine the structure of the CWA.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 492-93 (emphasis added).
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the CWA's statutory mandates.2 79
5. The Statutory and Regulatory Framework
The court did not interpret the CWA on its face as a clear manifestation of
congressional intent.2 80 Looking to the CWA as a whole, including its legisla-
tive history, the court concluded that the EPA's interpretation was reasonable
and consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the CWA.2 81 The court
pointed out that the CWA contains many provisions to ensure that water qual-
ity and pollution criteria will apply to all navigable waters of the United
States.282 The court found additional support for the EPA's interpretation of
the CWA in two other sections of the CWA, section 401 and section 402.283
a. Section 401
Arkansas contended that the "applicable water quality requirements" lan-
guage found in section 401 did not refer to the WQSs of the affected state.28
Section 401 requires the EPA to notify any state whose waters may be af-
fected by the discharge.2 8 5 If any state that is notified "determines that such
discharge will affect the quality of its waters so as to violate any water quality
requirement in such State," the state can require a public hearing on the per-
mit.286 The permit agency is then required to condition the permit, based on
the recommendations of any affected state and the EPA, so as to "insure com-
279. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 608 (10th Cir. 1990). Language from Ouellette supports
the Oklahoma court's reasoning. Specifically, the Ouellette court stated:
Application of an affected State's law to an out-of-state source also would undermine
the important goals of efficiency and predictability in the permit system. . . .The
CWA carefully defines the role of both the source and affected States, and specifically
provides for a process whereby their interests will be considered and balanced. . . .It
would be extraordinary for Congress, after devising an elaborate permit system that
sets clear standards, to tolerate common-law suits that have the potential to under-
mine this regulatory structure.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 496-97.
280. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 604.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 609. The court noted that the CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants except
pursuant to a permit, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342; it requires the EPA to establish effluent limita-
tions for point source discharges, id. §§ 1311-1312; it provides for EPA's approval of WQSs, id. §
1313, and state permit programs, id. § 1342(b); and it establishes minimum procedural require-
ments for state permit programs, id. § 1314(i). Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 609. The court also
pointed out that § 510 of the CWA allows states to set limitations more stringent than those of
the EPA, and the CWA is intended to be "technology forcing," pressing technology and econom-
ics to achieve attainable levels of effluent reduction. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 42 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. supra note 38, at 1460).
283. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 609-12.
284. Id. at 610.
285. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1988).
286. Id.
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pliance with applicable water quality requirements."2 8 Arkansas argued that
the applicable water quality requirements did not include the affected state's
WQSs.
The court disagreed with Arkansas, noting that the plain language of this
section expressed an intent to enable affected states to ensure that their water
quality would not be jeopardized by a discharge in another state.2 88 Further-
more, the court found that there would be no reason for this section to refer to
the effect on the quality of the affected state's waters in terms of "violat[ing]
any water quality requirement in such State" if the affected state's WQSs are
irrelevant in the permit process. Therefore, the court believed that it was more
likely that "applicable," as used in this section, referred to the federally-ap-
proved WQSs of affected states.289
The court found further support for the EPA's interpretation of the CWA
in the legislative history of section 401.90 In 1977, Congress amended section
401 to add section 303 to the list of the CWA's provisions for which a state
must certify compliance. 91 Section 303 requires a state to set its own WQSs
and submit them for EPA approval. 9 This means that a federally permitted
activity must be certified to comply with state WQSs adopted and approved
under section 303.29" The legislative history states, "[A]ll States have ap-
proved WQSs. Thus, it is reasonable to require that Federal permits and li-
censes should take into account State water quality plans, standards and re-
quirements adopted under section 303 to assure maintenance of water quality
in respective States. '294 Accordingly, the court ruled that the EPA's interpre-
tation of the CWA, requiring point sources to comply with all approved
WQSs, was reasonable.
b. Section 402
Arkansas also relied on the language of section 402(b)(5) that gives affected
states the right to submit "written recommendations," thus arguably giving
the affected state only an advisory role in the permit process.2 95 However, the
court found Arkansas' argument to be fatally flawed. First, the court believed
that giving an affected state an advisory role in the permit process and requir-
ing a point source to comply with an affected state's approved WQSs are not
287. Id.; see supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text (discussing § 401).
288. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 610 (10th Cir. 1990).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 64, 91 Stat. 1566, 1599 (1977).
292. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text (discussing § 303).
293. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 610; S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 72, reprinted in 1977
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4326, 4397.
294. S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 73, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 4326, 4398.
295. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 611-12 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(5)
(1988)).
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mutually exclusive." 6 Second, the section on which Arkansas relied could not
be looked at in isolation. The court pointed out that section 402(b)(5) merely
describes one aspect of the procedures that a permit program must provide to
insure communication among all interested parties. 97 Next, the court noted
that the language relied on is merely one of the many grounds upon which the
EPA may refuse permitting authority to a state." 8 Indeed, the court pointed
to section 402(b)(1)(A), which requires adequate state authority to "issue per-
mits which .. .apply, and insure compliance with, any applicable require-
ments of sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317 and 1343 of this title."2 9 Also, the
court noted that section 402(b)(1)(A) derives from section 401, which, as dis-
cussed above, requires permits to be conditioned to insure compliance by a
discharger with all applicable WQSs.300
c. Section 505
The court found further support for the EPA's interpretation of the CWA
in section 505, which authorizes citizen suits.301 Section 505 authorizes the
governor of an affected state to bring a civil suit against the EPA for viola-
tions of an effluent standard occurring in another state.302 The court, using
common sense and legislative history, stated that this section is meant to pro-
vide a remedy for a negative impact on the affected state's water quality, and
not necessarily for a violation of an effluent standard. 3 The court concluded
that this section's express remedy for protecting the water quality require-
ments of one state from violative discharges in another could not be reconciled
with Arkansas' view that discharge permits are not required to ensure compli-
296. Id. at 612.
297. Id.
298. Id. Section 402(b) provides:
[Tihe Governor of each State desiring to administer its own permit program ... may
submit to the [EPA] a full and complete description of the program .... The [EPA]
shall approve [the program] unless he determines that adequate authority does not
exist: (5) To insure that any State (other than the permitting State), whose waters
may be affected by the issuance of a permit may submit written recommendations to
the permitting State ....
33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(5) (1988).
299. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 612 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(l)(A) (1988)). In a footnote, the
court noted that compliance with state WQSs falls under the requirement of compliance with
§ 301. Id. at 612 n.21.
300. Id.; see supra notes 288-89 and accompanying text (discussing the court's finding that the
language of § 401 encompasses affected state's WQSs).
301. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 614 (10th Cir. 1990). Section § 505(a) of the CWA
authorizes "any citizen to commence a civil action ... against any person . . . who is alleged to
be in violation of an effluent standard or limitation ...or an order issued by the [EPA] or a
State with respect to such standard of limitation." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988).
302. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(h) (1988); see Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 614.
303. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 614. The legislative history points out that effluent limitations are
used to prevent pollution, and water quality is a measure of effectiveness. S. REP. No. 414, 92d
Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1426.
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ance with another state's WQSs.304
In its analysis, the court considered the CWA as a whole, including the
legislative history. The court determined that downstream water quality would
be virtually impossible to maintain if a source state did not comply with down-
stream states' WQSs. Adopting Arkansas' interpretation would result in "pol-
lution havens." Therefore, the court held that no discharge to a navigable
water may be permitted unless compliance with all applicable water quality
requirements, including the federally-approved WQSs of affected downstream
states, is assured.805
III. ANALYSIS
The court's interpretation of the CWA is a proper one when the CWA and
the preemption cases leading up to Oklahoma are considered together. An
examination of the CWA as a whole reveals the necessity of requiring out-of-
state dischargers to meet the WQSs of downstream affected states. Without
such a requirement, one state's attempts to eliminate discharges into its waters
would be undermined by a discharger located just beyond its borders in a
neighboring state. Furthermore, the plain language and legislative history of
sections 301 and 401 demonstrate that Congress intended an out-of-state dis-
charger to comply with the WQSs of potentially affected states.30 6
In addition, the preemption cases leading up to Oklahoma virtually elimi-
nated other sources of law from which an affected state could find a rem-
edy. 0 7 Therefore, denying affected states a means of controlling out-of-state
dischargers that impact the affected state's waters is inconsistent with the pol-
icy and language of the CWA. The Oklahoma decision provides a solution by
creating a preventative remedy: it requires an out-of-state point source to in-
sure compliance with an affected state's WQSs before any discharge occurs.
This remedy is only as effective as a downstream state's ability to have more
stringent WQSs approved by the EPA. Therefore, a downstream state should
be allowed to establish more stringent WQSs without interference from an
upstream state or the EPA.308
By requiring upstream, out-of-state sources to comply with a downstream
state's WQSs, the Oklahoma decision reverses the past relationship between
upstream and downstream states.309 This reversal is fully justified by the fact
that Congress decided to enact the CWA, creating a comprehensive approach
which carefully outlines the roles of both source and affected states. The rever-
304. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 614-15.
305. Id. at 615.
306. See supra notes 54-71 and accompanying text (discussing § 301); supra notes 131-39 and
accompanying text (discussing § 401).
307. See supra notes 203-20 and accompanying text (discussing the preemption cases).
308. See infra notes 365-84 and accompanying text (discussing a source state's ability to have
the EPA disapprove an affected state's WQSs because they are too stringent).
309. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (describing the upstream state's ability to
ignore the downstream state's WQSs).
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sal is also justified by the fact that attempting to restore or protect the nation's
waters would be theoretically impossible if upstream states could continue to
ignore the effects of their discharges on downstream states. Any efforts by a
downstream state could be rendered useless by an upstream, out-of-state
source.
A. The Oklahoma Decision was Correct
The Oklahoma court's analysis was well reasoned and supported. The court
began by recognizing that the CWA's "cornerstone" provision, section 301,
requires states to set permit limitations to meet applicable WQSs.3 10 Without
this requirement, the court correctly noted that a downstream state's attempts
to preserve its water quality could be undermined by upstream state
sources. 11 The court also reasoned that allowing point sources to ignore neigh-
boring state's WQSs would lead to congressionally condemned "pollution
shopping" by industry for those states with the lowest WQSs.3 1 2
The Oklahoma court also correctly distinguished Ouellette and Milwaukee
III, noting that both cases concerned plaintiffs who were attempting to use
state common law to circumvent the comprehensive regulatory scheme of the
CWA . 18 The court based its decision partly on this comprehensive regulatory
scheme, emphasizing its certification and permit procedures which facilitate
communication between neighboring states and the EPA.-1 This ensures that
issued permits comply with all applicable WQSs.3 15 Not only was the
Oklahoma court's analysis adequately supported, but its decision also pro-
motes the preservation and restoration of the nation's waters, consistent with
the goals of the Clean Water Act.
1. Section 301: Achieving Downstream Water Quality and the Problem of
Pollution Shopping
The Oklahoma court correctly pointed out that the objective of the CWA,
to restore and maintain the chemical and biological integrity of the nation's
waters, would become illusory if upstream sources did not have to respect
downstream state WQSs.8 10 Water pollution, like air pollution, inherently ig-
nores state boundary lines. This fact alone elevates pollution to a national con-
cern, requiring interstate cooperation. In this regard, the court correctly noted
310. See supra notes 264-69 and accompanying text (discussing the Oklahoma court's reliance
on § 301(b)(1)(C)); infra notes 316-31 and accompanying text (same).
311. See supra note 267 and accompanying text (discussing "pollution shopping").
312. Id.
313. See supra notes 271-79 and accompanying text (discussing the Oklahoma court's analysis
of the preemption cases); infra notes 332-40 and accompanying text (same).
314. See supra notes 280-305 and accompanying text (discussing the Oklahoma court's analy-
sis of the CWA's regulatory framework); infra notes 341-48 and accompanying text (same).
315. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 277-87 and accompanying text (discussing the Oklahoma court's
analysis).
1991] 1145
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
that section 301(b)(1)(C), requiring states to set limitations to meet WQSs,
would be frustrated if an out-of-state source did not meet an affected state's
WQSs" For example, an Illinois WQS for Lake Michigan that was more
stringent than Wisconsin's corresponding WQS would be merely aspirational
if a Wisconsin discharger did not have to meet the Illinois WQS.
Furthermore, the court's recognition that section 301 is not a mere timing
provision, but requires states to establish permit limitations to meet WQSs, is
supported by legislative history." 8 Congress stated, "Subsection (b) of section
301 establishes a technological basis for the determination of effluent limita-
tions for any discharge of pollutants provided that such limitations, at a mini-
mum, are, when applied to all point sources, adequate to meet existing or new
water quality standards as provided under section 303."319 Thus, Congress
saw section 303 as requiring states to establish effluent limitations necessary to
meet applicable WQSs.
Moreover, the court realized that congressionally condemned "pollution
shopping" would occur if each state was treated as an isolated entity with no
responsibility beyond its borders.320 Again considering the above Wisconsin/
Illinois example, if Wisconsin dischargers did not have to comply with Illinois
WQSs, then some businesses might be more attracted to Wisconsin in order to
exploit the lower WQSs.
Arkansas' concerns of a "chaotic" regulatory scheme, where any down-
stream state could impose its WQSs on any upstream state's dischargers and
where upstream dischargers would be unable to predict the applicable WQSs,
were properly dismissed by the court.32  The court pointed out that the effects
of an initial discharge become attenuated with time and distance, eventually
becoming undetectable.322 Therefore, the authority of a state to require com-
pliance with its WQSs depends on the ability to measure the impact of the
discharge on the receiving waters.?3
Sophisticated computer modeling and extensive studies were used in
Oklahoma to show that an out-of-state source's impact on downstream waters
can be predicted.32 Using these techniques, it is possible to predict the permit
conditions necessary to protect a state's water quality from an out-of-state dis-
charger.325 However, as the Oklahoma court noted, the effects of a discharge
317. Id.
318. See supra notes 54-71 and accompanying text (discussing § 301).
319. H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1972), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY.
supra note 59, at 787 (emphasis added); see supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing the
obligation of states to establish permit limitations that meet WQSs).
320. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 259-69 and accompanying text (discussing the court's rejection of Arkan-
sas' arguments).
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 607, 620-29 (10th Cir. 1990).
325. See supra notes 140-54 and accompanying text (discussing § 402 permit requirements).
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become attenuated with distance.3 " Thus, most downstream states will not be
able to detect or measure the effects of a distant upstream discharge. In such a
case, the downstream states will not be able to interfere with permitting of the
upstream source. Therefore, as a practical matter, an upstream discharger
generally will not be subject to the WQSs of all the downstream states.
Moreover, because the approval of every states' WQSs is centralized with
the EPA, not only does this make it easier to ascertain the applicable
WQSs,3 17 but it also aids in creating standards which are consistent and
evenly applied. This is also desirable from a practical standpoint. Most states
have their own permit-issuing agency." By requiring federal approval of
WQSs, the ends are placed in the hands of a centralized governing body. The
specific means used to achieve those ends, effluent limitations or other treat-
ment strategies, are left to the state permit agency.329 Each state, and each
type of discharger, have their own unique concerns and problems. Therefore, it
is preferable to leave decisions as to how WQSs are met in their hands. In-
deed, the CWA provides for each state to play a large role in the overall un-
dertaking of eliminating the discharge of pollutants into the nation's waters.
Furthermore, the EPA must notify all affected states before a permit is is-
sued.1 0 As a result of this permit hearing, the EPA should be able to deter-
mine and set the appropriate standards to insure compliance with every af-
fected state's WQSs 3"
2. The Preemption Cases and Section 510
Arkansas relied on Ouellette and Milwaukee III in arguing that section 510
restricts a state's authority to set more stringent standards only for sources
located within that state. 3 The Oklahoma court correctly distinguished both
of the preemption cases because they involved states seeking to establish more
stringent standards on an out-of-state source by the application of state or
federal common law in an enforcement action.333 In contrast, Oklahoma in-
326. See supra notes 269-70 and accompanying text (discussing the court's reasoning).
327. See Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 607.
328. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 54-130 and accompanying text (generally discussing the roles of a state
and the EPA under the CWA).
330. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing the EPA's duties under § 401).
331. Arkansas' concern has more merit when a geographic area like the Mississippi River Val-
ley bordering Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, and Arkansas is involved. However, an orderly reg-
ulatory scheme can still be fashioned because not only should the EPA be aware of the potentially
overlapping and conflicting WQSs of the neighboring states, but also computer modeling and pre-
permit hearings should be able resolve any conflicts between applicable WQSs and allow the EPA
to set the appropriate permit conditions to insure compliance with all applicable WQSs.
332. See supra notes 271-79 and accompanying text (discussing Arkansas' use of the preemp-
tion cases).
333. See supra notes 193-220 and accompanying text (discussing Milwaukee I1, Milwaukee
111, and Ouellette).
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volved the application of federal statutory law to the EPA permit process. 34
Therefore, Ouellette and Milwaukee III are distinguishable from this case.
The Oklahoma court also correctly reasoned that section 510 should not be
read as limiting the authority of the states to regulate interstate waters.33 5
Congress intended for the states to play a large role in regulating water pollu-
tion under the CWA. 36 The court recognized the contradiction that would
result if a state's authority to set "more restrictive standards" was limited only
to in-state sources."' The primary goal of the CWA is to eliminate discharges
into navigable waters.338 Denying Oklahoma the right to require out-of-state
sources to comply with its WQSs would be contrary to this goal. Furthermore,
the limiting language relied on by Arkansas does not appear in the portion of
section 510 granting the power to set stricter standards than those of the
CWA.339
Moreover, setting more stringent WQSs under section 510 does not allow a
state to directly regulate out-of-state dischargers because the state is not rely-
ing on state or federal common law. Rather, it is the EPA's approval of a
state's WQSs which makes them federally enforceable against other states.34 0
Oklahoma used its authority under section 510 to adopt more stringent WQSs
than required by the CWA. The WQSs were approved by the EPA under the
authority of the CWA. Oklahoma should, therefore, be able to apply their
WQSs, now federal statutory law, against an out-of-state point source.
3. Sections 401 and 402
The Oklahoma court's holding is also supported by the language of sections
401 and 402. The court criticized Arkansas' contention that the "applicable
water quality requirements" are the WQSs of only the source state. 1 The
334. See supra notes 223-34 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of the Oklahoma
case).
335. See supra notes 271-79 and accompanying text (discussing the Oklahoma court's analysis
of § 510).
336. See supra notes 82-127 and accompanying text (discussing a state's role under § 303); see
also S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 38, at 1422 ("The setting of [WQSs] for interstate navigable waters . . . is the keystone of
the present program for control of water pollution. . . . The task of setting [WQSs], assigned to
the States by the 1965 legislation, is lagging.").
337. See supra notes 258-67 and accompanying text (discussing the Oklahoma court's rejection
of Arkansas' argument that a state's authority to set more stringent standards was limited to in-
state sources).
338. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
339. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
340. See supra note 91-93 and accompanying text (discussing the federal enforceability of
WQSs); see also S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1422 ("The States have first responsibility for enforcement of their
standards. When approved by the [EPA], however, the standards for interstate navigable waters
become Federal-State standards.").
341. See supra notes 284-94 and accompanying text (discussing the Oklahoma court's analysis
of § 401).
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court found that section 401 refers to the effect on the water quality of the
affected state in terms of "violat[ing] any water quality requirement in such
State. 3 42 The legislative history also showed Congress's intent to include
EPA-approved WQSs in permits issued under the CWA.343 Therefore, the lan-
guage of section 401, as well as its legislative history, indicate that "applicable
water quality requirements" refer to the affected states EPA-approved
WQSs.3"
Arkansas also relied on the language of section 402 that gives affected states
the right to submit "written recommendations," thus arguably giving the af-
fected state only an advisory role in the permit process. ' 8 As the court noted,
merely because an affected state may have only an advisory role under this
section does not mean that the discharger does not have to comply with the
affected state's approved WQSs.143 Ironically, the court's conclusion is rein-
forced by express language in section 402, the same section on which Arkansas
relied. Specifically, section 402(b)(1)(A) requires adequate state authority to
"issue permits which . . . apply, and insure compliance with, any applicable
requirements of sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317 and 1343 of this title.
834 7
Thus, this section requires a state permit program to insure that an affected
state is able to make "written recommendations" about its WQSs in order to
enable the permit agency to "issue permits which . . . insure compliance with
any applicable requirements of [section] 1311 .""'
In conclusion, sections 401 and 402 provide mechanisms to insure communi-
cation between states with common waterways. These sections require the
EPA to notify a potentially affected state and to allow that state to call a
public hearing. Sections 401 and 402 provide for the affected state to advise
and make recommendations to the permit agency. Section 401 further pro-
vides that a permit cannot be issued unless compliance with all applicable
water quality requirements is assured. Therefore, these sections enable source
states and affected states to assist one another in issuing permits that comply
with an affected state's WQSs.
4. Section 505.
The language of section 505 also supports the Oklahoma decision. Section
505(h) authorizes "[a] Governor of a State [to] commence a civil action...
342. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1988).
343. See supra notes 290-94 and accompanying text (discussing the Oklahoma court's analysis
of the legislative history of § 401).
344. The language "applicable water quality requirements" is from 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2)
(1988).
345. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 612 (10th Cir. 1990); see supra notes 140-55 and ac-
companying text (discussing § 402).
346. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 612.
347. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(A) (1988). The court also pointed out § 303 WQSs are included
in the language of § 301. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 612.
348. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(l)(A) (1988).
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against the [EPA] .. .to enforce an effluent standard .. .the violation of
which is occurring in another State and is causing .. .a violation of any
water quality requirement in his State." 49 The court correctly interpreted this
section to provide a remedy for a negative impact on the affected state's water
quality and not necessarily for a violation of an effluent standard. 351. First, the
language "causing a violation of any water quality requirement in [the af-
fected] state" is distinguishable from a violation of an "effluent standard or
limitation." ' Second, the legislative history states that water quality is a
measure of program effectiveness and performance, whereas effluent limita-
tions are the basis for prevention and elimination of pollution.88 2 Thus, the
court correctly pointed out that this section's expressed remedy for protecting
the water quality requirements of one state from violative discharges in an-
other state rebutted Arkansas' argument that discharge permits are not re-
quired to ensure compliance with another state's WQSs.353 That is, requiring
an effluent limitation violation before a suit can be brought for the violation of
a WQS implies that the effluent limitations were set in order to comply with
the affected states WQSs.8 54
In sum, the court correctly recognized that the mandate of the CWA would
be undermined if an out-of-state source was not compelled to comply with a
neighboring state's WQSs. Maintaining and improving water quality would be
virtually impossible if a discharger were free to discharge pollution a short
distance from another state's border and ignore the federally-approved WQSs
of that neighboring state. Such a situation would also be inequitable because
349. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(h) (1988). See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text (discussing §
505).
350. See supra notes 301-04 and accompanying text (discussing the Oklahoma court's analysis
of § 505).
351. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 614 (10th Cir. 1990).
352. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
353. See supra note 301-04 and accompanying text (discussing the Oklahoma court's analysis
of § 505).
354. The language of section 505 implies that a potentially affected state's WQSs must be
considered when setting an out-of-state discharger's permit effluent limitations because it assumes
or requires a violation of an effluent limitation accompanied by a subsequent WQS violation in the
downstream state. If the effluent limitations were properly set with the downstream WQS in mind,
the WQS would only be violated when the effluent limitations were violated. If the out-of-state
discharger was not violating its permit effluent limitations, yet a downstream WQS violation was
occurring, then the affected state has a duty under 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(l)(A) to identify the
.waters where the effluent limitations set under § 301 are not stringent enough to implement the
applicable WQSs. Then under either § 1311 or § 1312, new effluent limitations would have to be
set. Thus, an upstream discharger will not be penalized for following its permit effluent limita-
tions, which for whatever reason are not stringent enough to meet downstream WQSs. By requir-
ing or assuming an effluent limitation violation before a suit can be brought, it implies that the
effluent limitations were set in order to comply with the affected state's WQSs.
However, § 505(h) could be read to mean that as long as the discharger follows its permit
conditions, it does not have to worry about its effects in another state. This is an unacceptable
interpretation as it would undermine the CWA's policy of preserving the integrity and quality of
the nation's waters.
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most of the discharge's impact would be on the neighboring state's water.
B. The Preventative Remedy
The preemption cases, Ouellette and Milwaukee II, eliminated almost all of
an affected state's previous remedies.355 After the preemption cases, a state
could no longer turn to its own state common law or federal common law to
protect its waters from out-of-state dischargers. Therefore, it was necessary for
the Oklahoma court to use federal statutory law, the CWA, to provide af-
fected states with an appropriate remedy if one was available at all. The
Oklahoma court accomplished this by recognizing an affected state's power
under sections 301, 401, and 510 to have an out-of-state discharger comply
with its WQSs.
According to Oklahoma, a state can challenge the approval of a permit to
an out-of-state discharger. The scenario begins, for example, with a state like
Illinois reviewing its WQSs for Lake Michigan. "6 The state must hold public
hearings and send any revised WQSs, along with supporting analysis to the
EPA.3 57 Once approved by the EPA, the WQSs becomes federally enforceable.
Any out-of-state discharge must comply with the WQSs 58 After the EPA
approves the WQSs, its approval becomes reviewable in the federal district
courts to determine if its actions were arbitrary and capricious.
When the City of Milwaukee, for example, seeks a permit to discharge
treated wastewater into Lake Michigan, it must provide the permit agency,
either the State of Wisconsin or the EPA, with a certification which states
that the discharge will comply with the applicable sections of the CWA.3"9
The permit agency must then notify the EPA that it has received an applica-
tion for a permit.360 The EPA will notify any state whose waters might be
affected by the discharge allowed in the permit. 61 Therefore, the EPA should
notify Illinois of the Milwaukee application.
When Illinois is notified of Milwaukee's permit application, the EPA will
grant it a hearing on the application upon request.362 At the hearing, Illinois
can require the permit issued to Milwaukee to be conditioned as necessary to
comply with Illinois' WQSs. This undoubtedly requires the presentation of ex-
tensive factual findings.363 If Illinois successfully proves that its WQSs will be
355. See supra note 203-20 and accompanying text (discussing the preemption cases).
356. Currently, Illinois' phosphorous WQS for Lake Michigan requires a level of no more than
0.007 mg/l. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 302.501 (Supp. 1988).
357. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text (discussing a state's requirements under
§ 303).
358. See supra note 305 and accompanying text (discussing the Oklahoma court's holding that
out-of-state dischargers must comply with the WQSs of affected states).
359. See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text (discussing § 401 certification
requirements).
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 621 (10th Cir. 1990) ("[I]t is difficult to
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affected by the discharge, the permit will be conditioned so as to comply with
Illinois' WQSs, and Milwaukee can begin discharging into Lake Michigan.
Thus, Illinois has a method of protecting its waters before any discharge and
subsequent water quality deterioration occurs.3 64
The Oklahoma decision also benefits the public by encouraging the eventual
elimination of pollutant discharge into navigable waters and preventing water
quality deterioration. Furthermore, especially with regard to environmental
"remedies," preventing a problem is better than correcting a problem. Estab-
lishing clear dialogue between all interested parties before a discharge occurs,
rather than allocating clean up costs after a prohibited discharge occurs, is the
most effective means of maintaining and restoring the integrity of the nation's
waters. Therefore, the court in Oklahoma provided the states with an effective
remedy, a remedy which also makes the mandate of the CWA meaningful.
However, the preventative remedy is only as effective as a state's ability to
have more stringent WQSs approved by the EPA. Thus, the WQS approval
process is of utmost importance to the states.
C. The EPA's Authority to Approve More Stringent WQSs
Every three years, when a state reviews its WQSs, it is required to hold
public hearings for the purpose of reviewing and adopting new WQSs. 365 A
state is required to make the proposed WQS revisions and the analyses sup-
porting the revisions available to the public prior to the hearing. " Presuma-
bly, a potential source state may attend and voice its concerns that the neigh-
boring state's WQSs are too stringent and will unduly restrict the source
state's industry. However, the potential source state appears to have no legal
recourse in the event its concerns are not adopted by the affected state.
Rather, the process by which the EPA approves a state's WQSs appears to be
the only method by which another state can challenge a neighboring state's
WQSs as too stringent.
In approving a state's WQSs, the EPA must determine if they are "consis-
tent with" -the requirements of the CWA.167 The EPA's approval of a state's
WQSs is reviewable in the federal district courts and will be upheld unless it is
found that the EPA has acted outside its scope of authority, abused its discre-
tion, or acted arbitrarily or capriciously. 6 An examination of the case law
summarize a record that consists of five boxes and four years of briefs, orders, transcripts, pre-
pared testimony, correspondence, technical reports and miscellaneous other documents .. ").
The last 15 pages of the Oklahoma opinion discussed the factual issues of the water quality of the
Illinois River. Id. at 620-35.
364. This method is preferable to bringing a nuisance or similar type action after an out-of-
state source has deteriorated another state's water quality because the damage to the environment
is prevented.
365. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text (discussing § 303).
366. 40 C.F.R. § 130.20(b) (1990).
367. See supra notes 89-127 and accompanying text (discussing the EPA's role in reviewing
state WQSs).
368. Id.
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discussing the EPA's approval of WQSs suggests that the source state has a
difficult burden in attempting to justify a reversal of any EPA action.369
Even more daunting is the case law which apparently precludes the argu-
ment that more stringent WQSs are not "consistent with" the requirements of
the CWA.370 As a result of the authority given to states under section 510 of
the CWA, at least one court has stated that the EPA had "no power to disap-
prove" a state's WQSs merely because they are more stringent than those
required by the CWA . 71 Courts have also expressly rejected the proposition
that states must consider economic and social factors when setting WQSs. 3 72
Instead, only scientific and technological factors must be considered, and then
only to show that the scientific criteria of the WQS will be sufficient to achieve
the designated use of the WQS.373 In addition, the source state's lack of au-
thority in the approval of more stringent standards by a neighboring state is
important because once a state's WQSs are approved by the EPA, the EPA
must incorporate those WQSs into permits when appropriate and has no au-
thority to set aside or modify them at a permit proceeding.37' No court has yet
encountered the precise situation of an upstream state challenging the EPA's
approval of a downstream state's WQSs. All of the existing case law deals
with the EPA's lack of authority to disapprove or modify a state's WQSs with
respect to in-state sources.
However, the EPA has the authority to promulgate WQSs for any state that
does not properly do so. 5 In one such situation, a court held that the EPA
was not required to consider any economic factors in setting WQSs for the
state. Since the state in that situation unsuccessfully argued that the WQSs
being promulgated were too stringent because they were not economically
achievable, it follows that this same argument would not succeed for an up-
stream state that was challenging a downstream state's WQSs. That is, eco-
nomic factors should not be considered in the setting of WQSs regardless of
whether it was a state or an in-state point source that claimed the WQSs were
not economically achievable. Furthermore, the CWA expressly provides for a
cost/benefit analysis and consideration of economic factors in sections pertain-
ing only to the setting of effluent limitations.3 76 This indicates that Congress
369. id.
370. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
371. Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279, 1284 (D.S.D. 1979); see supra notes
105-09 and accompanying text (discussing Homestake Mining Co.).
372. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing the court's decision in Mississippi
Commission on Natural Resources v. Costle finding that the EPA does not have to consider
economic impact in setting criteria).
373. Mississippi Comm'n on Natural Resources v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269, 1277-78 (5th Cir.
1980). For example, a state would be required to point to some scientific studies which show that
a criteria of at least 5.0 mg/L of dissolved oxygen is necessary to maintain water quality suitable
to use for fishing. Id. at 1278.
374. See supra notes 89-127 and accompanying text (discussing the EPA's authority with re-
gard to § 303 WQSs).
375. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing § 303 of the CWA).
376. See supra notes 54-71 and accompanying text (discussing § 301); supra notes 72-80 and
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did not intend for states to consider economic factors in setting WQSs. If Con-
gress wanted the EPA to consider economic factors in setting WQSs, it would
have expressly required it as it did for effluent limitations."'
Moreover, the concept of "alternate effluent control strategies" implies that
WQSs are purely scientific ends that must be achieved by whatever means a
source can develop. 78 As the legislative history indicates, "further reduction of
the level of effluent entering the affected waters may not be possible through
control technology, yet [it is] essential to water quality. Alternate effluent con-
trol strategies, such as the transportation of effluent to other less affected wa-
ters or the control of in-plant processes would have to be developed. 379 Con-
gress, therefore, contemplated that point sources would have an unconditional
imperative to meet the desired water quality, but Congress believed that point
sources could develop the strategies necessary to meet the WQSs. If necessity
is a source of invention, then refusing to consider economic factors in estab-
lishing WQSs provides incentive for point sources to develop alternative waste
treatment strategies and to use creative combinations of waste treatment strat-
egies to "eliminate the discharges of pollutants into navigable waters" 8" and
"restore and maintain the . . . integrity of the Nation's waters."'38
Lastly, the goal of the CWA is to eliminate the discharge of all pollutants
into navigable waters. It is hard to imagine the EPA determining that a par-
ticular WQS is "consistent with" the requirements of the CWA because it
strictly limits the amount of a pollutant that will be tolerated in a body of
water.
The unique economic concerns of each state and each point source are taken
into account in the specific application of effluent limitations and permit condi-
tions by the agency issuing a permit. Thus, a point source and its permit-
issuing agency have control over the means used to comply with the required
ends. In short, as long as a state's WQSs comport with modern science and
technology, that is, if they are measurable and maintain the desired water
quality, neighboring states must comply with them. Any unique circumstances
of the source state, economic or otherwise, can and will be considered in set-
ting effluent limitations and other permit conditions. For example, the City of
Milwaukee my not argue that it will be economically difficult for Milwaukee's
accompanying text (discussing § 302).
377. Thus, economics will play a role in setting effluent limitations to individual dischargers.
Even though the latest, best technology may be able to virtually eliminate the quantity of pollu-
tants in a discharge, and thus warrant the setting of strict effluent limitations, the CWA will not
require the discharger to implement the technology if it is prohibitively expensive. See I LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 59, at 169 (stating that when determining best practicable technology,
the EPA should consider factors such as the age of the discharge plant, its size, the unit processes
involved, and the cost of applying such technology).
378. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 46 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 38, at 1464.
379. Id.
380. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6) (1988).
381. Id. § 1251(a).
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industry to comply with Illinois' WQSs. However, the permit agency will con-
duct a cost/benefit hearing before it sets the effluent limitations for the per-
mit. 82 At this hearing, a Milwaukee discharger may present evidence to the
permit agency showing that it is only economically feasible for the discharger
to limit the amount of phosphorous concentration in its effluent to ten parts
per million. The permit agency may take this into account in conditioning the
permit, but the discharger will not be excused from complying with Illinois'
WQSs. Instead, the permit will have to contain restrictions requiring the dis-
charger to use alternate waste treatment strategies to enable it to comply with
Illinois WQSs. 8s For example, the discharger may be required to implement
some in-plant processes, or transport the pollutants to a proper land disposal
site. Thus, the scientific ends (Illinois' WQSs) must not be compromised, but
the discharger may choose any alternative means to achieve those ends.
A source state, therefore, appears to have little ability to challenge an af-
fected state's WQSs merely because they are more stringent than those re-
quired by the CWA.184 Not only are economic arguments foreclosed, but the
EPA has no authority to disapprove WQSs set pursuant to section 510 merely
because they are more stringent than those required by the CWA. Similarly,
the EPA cannot modify or set aside such WQSs when conditioning a dis-
charge permit. This represents a reversal of the past relationship between a
source state and an affected state with regard to interstate water pollution.385
D. The Necessity of Reversing the Prior Relationship Between Source
States and Affected States
With regard to federal/state relations, the Oklahoma decision, by giving
more power to states to set their own WQSs, represents what some commenta-
tors have called a regulatory scheme which is "responsive to the concerns of
the new federalism." '86 However, with regard to relations between the states,
382. See supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text (discussing the setting of § 301 effluent
limitations based on best available technology ("BAT") and best conventional pollutant control
technology ("BCT")).
383. See supra notes 378-79 and accompanying text (discussing alternate effluent control
strategies).
384. Any concern of abuse by a downstream state is mitigated in part by the fact that the
downstream state also has to comply with any more stringent WQSs that it establishes. Thus, it is
somewhat illogical to assume any downstream state will immediately set more stringent WQSs.
However, potential for abuse does exist in that a downstream state may attempt to establish a
"border protection zone" of extremely stringent WQSs that would effectively apply to only the
first 15 miles of all the waters entering its borders from other states. An upstream state may also
find procedural or other substantive problems, such as vagueness if the WQSs are narrative, with
a downstream state's WQSs.
385. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (describing the source state's ability to
ignore the affected state's WQSs).
386. Gaba, supra note 30, at 1170; see also Lyons, Federalism and Resource Development: A
New Role for States?, 12 ENVTL. L. 931, 933-34 (1982) (discussing how the new federalism
contemplates a larger role for states in environmental regulation); Pederson, The New Federalism
in Environmental Law: Taking Stock, 12 Envtl. L. Repr. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 15,065 (Dec. 1982)
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one might argue that the Oklahoma decision has overstepped the bounds of
traditional state sovereignty by giving downstream states the ability to indi-
rectly regulate upstream states. Now that an upstream state's point source
must insure compliance with a downstream state's WQSs, the upstream state
appears to be under the control of the downstream state."8 ' One might even
argue that the upstream state's apparent inability to have the EPA disapprove
another state's more stringent WQSs puts the upstream state at the mercy of
the downstream state. However, this reversal in the relationship between up-
stream and downstream states is justified by the supremacy of federal law over
state law, by the fact that the objectives of the CWA would be undermined if
this relationship did not exist, and by a desire to reduce negative externalities.
Furthermore, upstream states are not at the mercy of the downstream state
because many alternatives to discharging into the nation's waters are
available. 88
The Oklahoma court was very much aware of the state sovereignty and
indirect regulation problems raised by this case." However, the court pointed
out that the issue was not whether one state could enforce more stringent stan-
dards set under its own state law against another state, but rather, whether the
CWA, as federal statutory law, required one state to comply with another
state's WQSs set under the CWA.890 After a thorough examination of the
CWA and its legislative history, the court held that an upstream state must
comply with a downstream state's federally-approved WQSs"I
The objective of the CWA, to restore and maintain the chemical and biolog-
ical integrity of the nation's waters, would become illusory if an upstream
source did not have to comply with a downstream state's WQSs.892 This be-
comes self-evident when one considers that water pollution does not recognize
state boundary lines. Thus, Oklahoma's attempts to establish more stringent
WQSs under the CWA to protect the integrity of its scenic river area would
be merely aspirational if an Arkansas point source were able to discharge just
miles above the Oklahoma border without having to comply with Oklahoma
WQSs. Therefore, the CWA would collapse on itself if a downstream state's
WQSs could be ignored by upstream point sources.
(discussing the problems of federal-state relations in the environmental area).
387. This situation is similar to that occurring in Milwaukee III, 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984),
where the court held that § 510 of the CWA did not allow Illinois to use its own state law to
establish more stringent standards for a Wisconsin point source. Id. at 413-14; see supra notes
195-202 and accompanying text (discussing the Milwaukee III decision).
388. See infra notes 395-400 and accompanying text (discussing some specific alternatives to
direct water discharging).
389. In a footnote, the court stated, "We do not suggest one state may directly regulate the
conduct of a discharger in another state. Such exercise of jurisdiction would exceed traditional
bounds of sovereignty." Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 606 n.9 (10th Cir. 1990).
390. Id.
391. As federal law, the EPA-approved WQSs become the "supreme Law of the Land." See
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
392. See supra notes 264-69 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of not requiring an
upstream state to comply with a downstream state's WQSs).
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Furthermore, had the Oklahoma court not decided as it did, downstream
states would be at the mercy of the upstream states, and therefore, would bear
a disproportionate amount of the environmental impact and costs of the dis-
charge on water quality degradation. Perhaps the best example of this is the
Illinois/City of Milwaukee saga. 93 The facts of the Oklahoma decision also
provide a useful example. If the Arkansas discharge was allowed regardless of
Oklahoma's WQSs, then Oklahoma would only have recourse under Arkansas
nuisance law for any water quality degradation caused to its scenic river
area. 94 Assuming this remedy to be inadequate,3 95 not only is Arkansas' pollu-
tion now Oklahoma's problem, Oklahoma is left with a disproportionate
amount of the expense of restoring its water quality while the Arkansas point
source has not sufficiently reflected its actual costs. This is a negative external-
ity which will lead to an inefficient use of resources by the Arkansas point
source. Requiring the Arkansas point source to comply with Oklahoma's
WQSs prevents the degradation of Oklahoma's waters by an out-of-state
source and forces the point source to more accurately reflect the actual costs
of its discharge. Moreover, given the purpose of the CWA, it is preferable to
require an upstream point source to utilize alternate methods of waste disposal
to meet the downstream state's WQSs rather than to allow an upstream state
to cause water quality degradation in a downstream state.
Finally, not only are alternatives to direct water discharge available, but
Congress seemed to require them to be utilized if necessary.9 ' Municipal was-
tewater treatment facilities, like the one involved in Oklahoma, mainly pro-
duce sewage sludge as a result of their treatment processes.3 97 Some common
alternatives of disposing this sludge instead of discharging it into a river in-
clude land application, composting, landfilling, and incineration." Each alter-
native has its own advantages and disadvantages, but all are viable alterna-
tives to discharging into navigable waters. 99 Other alternatives include the
development of in-plant processes which are designed to reduce the amount of
393. See supra notes 16, 191-202, 205-10 and accompanying text (discussing the various litiga-
tion between Illinois and the city of Milwaukee).
394. This assumes that the Arkansas point source did not violate its permit conditions.
395. This assumption is reasonable because as long as the Arkansas point source complies with
Arkansas WQSs, it follows that the discharge would not cause a nuisance under Arkansas state
law. A nuisance is an-infringement on the use and enjoyment of another's property. Therefore, it
would be very difficult, if not impossible, to argue that the same discharge rises to the level of a
nuisance at an even more distant, downstream location.
396. See supra note 379 and accompanying text (quoting S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
46 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1464).
397. Massey, How Federal Law Encourages Land Application of Municipal Wastewater Efflu-
ents and Sludges, 23 S. TEx. L.J. 1, 8 (1982). Sewage sludge is defined as a mixture of water,
inorganic, and organic solids removed from municipal wastewater by physical, biological- and/or
chemical treatment. Id.
398. Comment, Alternatives to Ocean Dumping: A Municipal Dilemma, 6 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 157 passim (1988). The commentators analyze the technical and legal viability of each
alternative.
399. Id. at 200-01.
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a pollutant produced for a given process. °0 Another possibility might be for
the source to purchase discharge rights from another point source. 0 1 This far
from exhaustive list of alternatives indicates that an upstream state point
source will not be at the mercy of a downstream state that adopts more strin-
gent WQSs.
In sum, the Oklahoma decision reverses the previously existing relationship
between upstream and downstream states. No longer is an upstream state
point source free to discharge into an interstate body of water without regard
for the downstream state's WQSs. This reversal is justified by the supremacy
of federal law over state law, by the fact that the objectives of the CWA
would be undermined if this relationship did not exist, by a desire to reduce
negative externalities, and by the availability of alternatives to discharging
into the nation's waters.
IV. IMPACT: STATE RIGHTS AND REMEDIES UNDER THE CWA
A. State and Federal Roles in the Regulation of Interstate Water
Pollution
One result of the Oklahoma decision will be to increase the EPA's responsi-
bility of review and oversight in establishing and implementing WQSs. Con-
gress intended for the states and the federal government to both play large
roles under the CWA. The EPA's role in approving and implementing WQSs
will surely increase as states set more and more stringent WQSs, and as other
states call on the EPA to determine the appropriate WQSs to include in a
permit. The states will, and appropriately should, retain control over the initial
setting of WQSs4 °2 However, a centralized body such as the EPA is necessary
to maintain a uniform system of water pollution control and to ensure that
WQSs are being set that incorporate the proper scientific criteria.
WQSs are the desired ends which are achieved by the means of effluent
limitations and alternative effluent strategies. Viewing the CWA in this man-
ner, the CWA correctly approaches the unique problem of water pollution.
The inherent transient nature of water pollution demands that the ends of
water pollution regulation, the WQSs, be overseen by a single unifying entity.
Uniformity, as well as interstate cooperation and communication, is promoted
by a centralized body. A federal agency with sufficient resources could ensure
that WQSs and effluent limitations reflect modern science and technology.
Moreover, federal oversight and protection provides the impetus for states to
set stricter, pollution-reducing standards which help to achieve the mandate of
400. See supra note 379 and accompanying text (quoting S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess.
46 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1464). For example, the point
source may be able to recover some of its carbon dioxide or heavy metals.
401. See Gaba, supra note 30, at 1174-75 (discussing how the total amount of allowable dis-
charge for a segment of a river is allocated among point sources sharing that segment).
402. See generally id. (stating that the EPA should only review a WQS's criteria aspect and
leave the setting of a WQS's use aspect to the state's discretion).
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the CWA.
However, the unique characteristics and concerns of each state require that
the designation of a WQS's use aspect be left to the states.403 Similarly, re-
spect for the differences among the states requires that each state's permit
agency have control over the establishment of the means, the effluent limita-
tions, and any alternative effluent strategies, which are necessary to achieve
the applicable WQSs. Therefore, the CWA correctly approaches the problem
of water pollution regulation because it ultimately places the burden of estab-
lishing WQSs in a centralized body, the EPA, while allowing individual states
to control the means of achieving WQSs through their own permit agencies.
B. Encouraging States to Revise More Stringent WQSs
The Oklahoma decision will also encourage states to conscientiously review
their existing WQSs and to adopt more stringent WQSs. States are required
to revise their WQSs every three years. 0 4 In order to insure compliance with
WQSs, a potentially affected state must review and revise its WQSs and have
them approved by the EPA. 05 A state which does not revise its WQSs and
later finds that they are not as stringent as it desires, can only impose more
stringent permit conditions on out-of-state dischargers by using the common
law of the state where the point source is located. 6 Not only will more states
be interested in revising their WQSs and having them approved by the EPA,
but upstream states will presumably have an interest in entering into compacts
with neighboring downstream states to develop a cooperative regulatory sys-
tem over the waters that they share.'0 7 Thus, because the Oklahoma decision
requires source states to comply with an affected state's WQSs, the decision
encourages states that are interested in protecting their waters to set more
stringent WQSs.
C. Remedies
Returning to the running example, assume that Illinois' WQSs are ap-
proved, and Milwaukee's permit is conditioned to ensure compliance with Illi-
nois' standards. The next question becomes the type of remedies that the
CWA provides for Illinois to enforce the permit conditions and otherwise en-
sure that its WQSs are met.
403. See id. at 1214 (reiterating that the setting of a designated use is an economic and land
use policy question traditionally left to the states).
404. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text (discussing § 303 requirements).
405. See supra notes 365-84 and accompanying text (discussing the EPA's approval of state
WQSs and the ability of one state to have another state's WQSs disapproved because they are too
stringent).
406. See supra notes 203-20 and accompanying text (discussing the preemption cases).
407. The CWA expressly provides for the EPA to encourage compacts between the states. 33
U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1988).
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1. Federal Enforcement
The Milwaukee discharger is required to file a discharge monitoring report
("DMR").' 0 8 Illinois can use this information to determine if Milwaukee is
violating its permit conditions. Once Illinois notifies the EPA of Milwaukee's
violations, the EPA has a nondiscretionary duty to issue a compliance order.4 0 9
If Milwaukee then violates the compliance order, the mandatory language of
the CWA requires the EPA to assess civil penalties.4 10 Thus, Illinois can seek
to have the EPA penalize an out-of-state permit violator.
2. Section 505: Citizen Suits
Section 505 is of interest to affected states in enforcing WQSs for two rea-
sons. 4 1 First, it would allow an affected state to bring a suit directly against
an out-of-state point source.4 12 Second, section 505 provides for the awarding
of attorney's fees when appropriate. 41 3 Unfortunately, it is not clear whether a
state is a "citizen" for the purposes of section 505.414 A literal reading of the
CWA makes a state a "citizen." However, courts have determined that a state
is not a "citizen" under section 505 where the state brings a suit against an in-
state source. 18 Because section 505 provides that a "citizen" may not bring a
suit if the EPA or state is already diligently pursuing a remedy under the
CWA, courts have found it unlikely that Congress intended a state to take
advantage of this section." 6 Courts have also noted that there is little sense for
the "citizen" to be required to give notice to the state before the "citizen" files
suit if the state is, in fact, the "citizen."
However, the courts' reasoning in determining that a state is not a "citizen"
would not apply if an affected state brought a "citizen" suit against a source
state. The irrationality of a state providing itself with notice disappears when
it, as an affected state "citizen," is notifying a source state. Furthermore,
when a state is pursuing a remedy against an in-state source, it presumably is
acting on behalf of its "citizens." It is, therefore, logical for the CWA to pre-
vent a "citizen" from bringing a suit against the same polluter if his state
already is pursuing the claim. However, an affected state has its own concerns
regarding the out-of-state polluter, and cannot presume that the source state
will be acting on behalf of the affected state.
A convincing argument that an affected state is not a "citizen" for purposes
408. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text (discussing § 505).
409. See supra notes 156-69 and accompanying text (discussing federal enforcement and the
role of the EPA under § 309). The EPA can also take other actions based on its discretion. Id.
410. Id.
411. See supra notes 171-89 and accompanying text (discussing § 505).
412. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
413. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
414. See supra notes 178-89 and accompanying text (discussing whether a state is a "citizen"
under § 505).
415. Id.
416. Id.
1160 [Vol. 40:1107
OKLAHOMA v. EPA
of this section does exist. Section 505(h) authorizes the governor of an affected
state to commence a civil action against the EPA for his failure to enforce "an
effluent standard or limitation" which is being violated in another state and
"causing a violation of any water quality requirement in his State.' 1 7 Because
a "citizen" already has the authority to bring suits against EPA for failing to
perform a nondiscretionary act or duty, 418 section 505(h) would be superfluous
if an affected state were considered to be a "citizen." However, this argument
is mitigated by the fact that the language of the two sections authorizes
slightly different actions, and therefore, may not be entirely superfluous. 19
The better result is to not consider an affected state to be a "citizen" for the
purposes of bringing a "citizen" suit. The legislative history supports the inter-
pretation that this section was meant to provide a remedy only when the EPA
or a state agency has not taken action.' 0 The affected state has adequate re-
course through federal enforcement under section 309,421 and the Oklahoma
decision also provides a sufficient preventative remedy.' 22 Furthermore, al-
though an affected state's governor could not directly sue an out-of-state point
source that is violating the affected state's WQSs as a citizen could, the gover-
nor can bring suit against the EPA for failure to enforce the provisions of the
CWA and still have the opportunity for attorney's fees to be awarded.2' De-
nying an affected state the right to bring a "citizen" suit would also provide
incentive for potentially affected states to take full advantage of their pre-
permit rights. Moreover, denying an affected state the right to bring a "citi-
zen" suit will help keep the resolution of interstate water regulation issues
within control of the EPA, and therefore, also reduce the amount of federal
litigation.
In sum, while recognizing an affected state as a citizen for purposes of sec-
417. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(h) (1988). In regard to determining if a "water quality requirement" is
being violated, Congress has stated that effluent limitations are used to prevent pollution, and
water quality is a measure of effectiveness. See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text (distin-
guishing between WQSs and effluent limitations).
418. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1988).
419. The language in § 505(h) authorizes the governor of an affected state to bring an action
against the EPA, wiihout notice as required in § 505(b), only "to enforce effluent standards or
limitations." Id. § 1365(h). This is different from the language in § 505(a)(2), which authorizes
suits against the "Administrator for his failure to perform any act or duty which is not discretion-
ary." Id. § 1365(a)(2).
420. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text (discussing § 505). However, the language
of the legislative history does not seem to address affected states. Rather, it seems to speak to the
order of enforcement in the source state against an in-state polluter.
421. See supra notes 156-69 and accompanying text (discussing federal enforcement under
§ 309 of the CWA).
422. See supra notes 355-64 and accompanying text (discussing the preventative remedy that
the Oklahoma decision creates).
423. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1988). Section 1365(d) provides in part: "The court, in issuing any
final order in any action brought pursuant to this section, may award costs of litigation (including
reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such
award is appropriate." Id. Thus, because the governor is authorized to bring an action pursuant to
§ 505(h) of this section, attorney's fees should be available.
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tion 505 would increase the remedies available to an affected state, the lan-
guage of section 505 does not seem to contemplate such a result. Furthermore,
section 505(h) allows an affected state's governor to bring a suit against the
EPA to enforce the CWA, thereby providing the affected state with a method
to protect itself from an out-of-state discharge. Perhaps more importantly, at-
torney's fees should be available to the state regardless of whether a state is
allowed to bring suit against the point source as a "citizen," or against the
EPA through its governor.
V. STEPS TO INSURE COMPLIANCE
A. EPA Approval of a State's WQSs
States are required to revise their WQSs every three years.42 ' To ensure
compliance with its WQSs, an affected state must review and revise its WQSs
and have them approved by the EPA."2 If a state fails to revise its WQSs and
later wishes to make them more stringent, its only remedy will be to require
more stringent permit conditions on out-of-state dischargers by using the com-
mon law of the state where the discharger is located.4 26
Assuming that Illinois conscientiously reviews its WQSs, it must hold public
hearings as part of its review process.4 27 After Illinois holds the required pub-
lic hearings for review of its WQSs, it must submit the results of the review
and any supporting analyses to the EPA within thirty days of the final state
action adopting the revised WQSs.' 28 The EPA's review of Illinois' proposed
WQSs involves consideration of five factors. 42 19 If all are met, the EPA must
approve the WQSs. The EPA must then notify the state within sixty days if its
revisions are approved or within ninety days if they are disapproved.42 0 If they
are disapproved, the EPA must specify the changes needed to meet compliance
with the CWA.2 1 Once approved, the WQSs become individual point source
obligations through the permit process.
B. Conditioning the Permit
In the running example, Illinois has established its WQSs for Lake Michi-
gan. The Oklahoma decision requires all dischargers to comply with the EPA-
approved, Illinois WQSs, including out-of-state dischargers."2  When the City
424. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text (discussing § 303 requirements).
425. See supra notes 365-84 and accompanying text (discussing the EPA's approval of state
WQSs and the ability of one state to have another state's WQSs disapproved because they are too
stringent).
426. See supra notes 203-20 and accompanying text (discussing the preemption cases).
427. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
428. 40 C.F.R. § 131.20(c) (1990).
429. See supra note 89 (listing the factors promulgated by 40 C.F.R. § 131.5 (1990)).
430. 40 C.F.R. § 131.21(a)(I)-(2) (1990).
431. Id. § 131.21(a)(2).
432. See supra note 305 and accompanying text (discussing the Oklahoma court's holding that
out-of-state dischargers must comply with the WQSs of affected states).
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of Milwaukee applies to its permit issuing agency, that agency must send a
copy of the application to the EPA."3 The EPA will review the application
and notify Illinois and any other state if the EPA has reason to believe that
the state's waters might be affected by the discharge.""' Assuming the EPA is
convinced that Illinois' waters will be affected and notifies Illinois, a hearing
concerning the conditioning of the permit will be held upon Illinois' request.
Relying on the Oklahoma holding that no permit shall issue unless compliance
with the affected state's WQSs is insured, Illinois should use the hearing to
resolve the factual issues involved in determining what permit conditions will
be necessary to insure that Milwaukee complies with Illinois WQSs. Permits
issued either by the EPA or by an approved state agency are both subject to
the same requirements under the CWA. 35 The EPA retains the power to veto
state-issued permits. 3 If Illinois, or any other potentially affected state, is not
satisfied with the permit as issued, the federal court of appeals has the power
to review the EPA's veto or approval of state permit decisions. 37
It is important for a state to conscientiously review its WQSs to insure that
they are stringent enough to protect the state's desired use of its waters. If the
state's current WQSs are not as stringent as the state would like, the state's
only recourse against an out-of-state point source will be under the common
law of the source state. Furthermore, an affected state must make certain that
the permit conditions are sufficient to protect its WQSs. The approval and
permit processes, therefore, will take on greater importance as a result of the
Oklahoma decision.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit properly interpreted the CWA in its Oklahoma decision.
Prior to Oklahoma, the preemption cases appeared to leave an affected state
with little ability to protect its waters from out-of-state dischargers. Out-of-
state dischargers, like the pollution they discharged, could ignore state bound-
ary lines. As a result of the Oklahoma decision, source states are required to
respect and comply with an affected state's WQSs. The decision recognizes
that the transitory nature of water pollution makes it a national problem
which cannot be solved by isolated, state-by-state regulation. Indeed, the
Tenth Circuit realized that Oklahoma's attempts to preserve its water quality
by setting stringent WQSs would be merely aspirational if their WQSs could
be violated by a Arkansas discharger. As a result of the decision, states will be
encouraged to establish more stringent WQSs. Furthermore, a central forum
(the EPA) is necessary to maintain a uniform, national system for the ap-
proval and implementation of WQSs.
433. See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text (discussing § 401 requirements).
434. Id.
435. See supra notes 140-55 and accompanying text (discussing § 402).
436. Id.
437. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (1988); see District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 859
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
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The Oklahoma decision also creates a preventative remedy for potentially
affected states. A state can set its WQSs as stringently as it desires, have them
approved by the EPA, and then require dischargers to comply with them
before a permit is issued and any discharge takes place. This preventative rem-
edy is further strengthened by the fact that a state that believes its neighbor-
ing state's EPA-approved WQSs are too stringent will not be able to present
economic evidence to the EPA. Thus, EPA-approved WQSs are an uncondi-
tional imperative, limited only by the dictates of modern science and technol-
ogy. However, an out-of-state discharger required to comply with another
state's WQSs retains economic flexibility in choosing the means by which the
WQSs will be met. Hopefully, this will encourage dischargers to develop inno-
vative technological solutions to the nation's ever-increasing pollution
problems.
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